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ARTICLES
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REVISITED: HISTORIC
ACCOMPLISHMENT OR SURRENDER?
WiLLIAM B. SPONG, JR.*
The fact is that never in the history of this country has an
effort been made to restrain the war powers in the hands of the
President.... [1it will make history in this country such as
has never been made before.
-Senator Jacob Javits'
I wish to say ... that I do not view this as a historic recapture;
on the contrary I view it as a historic surrender.
-Senator Thomas Eagleton2
From 1969 to 1974 Congress considered various war powers pro-
posals, following adoption of the Senate's National Commitments
Resolution and revival of suggestions for creation of a new joint
congressional committee for consultation with the President regard-
ing emergency military undertakings. 4 Reflecting unquestionably
the divisiveness caused by the nation's long involvement in South-
east Asia, this legislative activity, which culminated in the enact-
ment of the War Powers Resolution of 1973,1 revealed a growing
*LL.B., University of Virginia. General Counsel, Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy; Cutler Lecturer in Law, The College of
William and Mary. United States Senator from Virginia, 1967-73; Floor Manager for the War
Powers Bill in the Senate, 1972.
Ed.- Much of the work for this Article was done during the author's stay as a Guest
Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution.
The author acknowledges the assistance of D. Alan Rudlin, Associate General Counsel, and
Roger Majak, Congressional Specialist, Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, in the collection of material for the legislative history
contained in the Article.
1. 119 CONG. REc. S18,966 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973).
2. 119 CoNo. Rc. S20,107 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973).
3. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); SENATE Comni. ON FoREIGN RELAmONS, REPORT
ON NATIONAL CohmrIlmmrs, S. REP. No. 129, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
4. See Hearings on Separation of Powers Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1967) (testimony of Dr. Alfred
de Grazia). See also Hearings on S. 731, S.J. Res. 18, and S.J. Res. 59 Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (testimony of Professor Henry
Commager and Congressman Frank Horton). Senator Hubert Humphrey and Congressman
Clement Zablocki have long advocated a Joint Committee on National Security and have
introduced bills to create such a joint committee.
5. Pub. L. No. 93-148 (Nov. 7, 1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-48 (Supp. 1975)).
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consciousness in Congress of the domination of war powers by the
executive branch during nearly a quarter of a century of after-the-
fact consultation with Congress. This activity also represented a
mounting determination within Congress to enact some mechanism
to assure congressional participation in the decisions of war and
peace, in keeping with the intent of the Founding Fathers and the
public expectation, rooted in that intent, that elected representa-
tives would participate in such decisions.
After identifying the issues addressed by the Resolution through
a review of the process of compromise that produced it,6 this Article
will address some of the criticisms directed at the Resolution finally
adopted and consider some potential constitutional problems. Ulti-
mately, with an abundance of trepidation, some speculation regard-
ing the efficacy of the Resolution will be offered in light of the flurry
of events in Southeast Asia that drew attention to the Resolution
in 1975.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
On March 29, 1972, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee re-
ported to the Senate floor a hybrid bill, the War Powers Act,' which
combined prior proposals by Senators Jacob Javits,8 Thomas Eagle-
ton,' and John Stennis." The proposals of these three Senators had
common characteristics. Each sought to define the circumstances
under which the President could commit the armed forces to hostili-
ties." Each required prior congressional authorization or a declara-
The Resolution is reproduced as Appendix 1 of this Article. The House and Senate measures
that were compromised to produce the Resolution as enacted appear as Appendix 6 and
Appendix 7.
6. For review of war powers proposals considered by Congress in the years prior to 1972,
see Spong, Can Balance be Restored in the Constitutional War Powers of the President and
Congress?, 6 U. RICH. L. REv. 1 (1971), discussing S. 1880, 92d Cong., 1st Sees. (1971) (intro-
duced by Senator Bentsen); S. 731, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (introduced by Senator
Javits); S.J. Res. 95, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (introduced by Senator Stennis); S.J. Res.
59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (introduced by Senator Eagleton); S.J. Res. 18, 92d Cong.,
1st Sees. (1971) (introduced by Senator Taft); H.J. Res. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sees. (1971) (intro-
duced by Representative Zablocki). See also Reveley, Constitutional Allocation of the War
Powers Between the President and Congress: 1787-1788, 15 VA. J. INTL L. 73 (1974).
7. S. 2956, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See 118 CoNG. Rac. 11,021 (1972).
8. S. 731, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
9. S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
10. S.J. Res. 95, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also 100 CONG. Rac. 6359, 2902 (1954).
11. S. 731, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(A) (1971); S.J. Res. 95, 92d Cong., 1st Sees. § 2 (1971);
S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 3(a)-(c) (1971).
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tion of war for the President to act, except in enumerated emergency
circumstances which would permit commitment of armed forces for
as long as 30 days without explicit congressional authorization.12 All
three proposals required the President to report to Congress shortly
after he had initiated hostilities and periodically thereafter.13
During March and April of 1972, the Senate devoted two weeks
of debate to the Committee's proposal. Despite numerous efforts to
weaken or derail the bill," alteration was limited to the adoption of
three clarifying amendments offered by its sponsors. 5 These amend-
ments concerned the emergency powers of the President to act in
situations on the high seas involving a direct and imminent threat
to the lives of American citizens, the right of the President as
Commander-in-Chief to continue repelling enemy attacks after the
30-day period if in the course of bringing about a prompt disengage-
ment of hostilities, and a provision that the Act should not be con-
strued to require further statutory authorization for members of the
armed forces to participate in the unified command structure of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On April 13 the Sen-
ate passed the War Powers Act. 6
12. S. 731, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ I(B)-(D) (1971); S.J. Res. 95, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §
4(a),(b) (1971); S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1971).
13. S. 731, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(B) (1971); S.J. Res. 95, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1971);
S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1971).
14. Opposition to war powers legislation was led by Senators Goldwater and Dominick
among the Republicans and by Senator Gale McGee on the Democratic side. Senator Goldwa-
ter was constant in his opposition, beginning with the Senate hearings in 1971 and continuing
through all debates and votes thereafter. His basic position was that Congress could not
change the Constitution through legislation limiting the powers of the Commander-in-Chief
as he believed the war powers bill would do. He believed that the only proper procedure was
to amend the Constitution. See Goldwater, The President's Constitutional Primacy in For-
eign Relations and National Defense, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 463 (1973); Goldwater, President's
Ability to Protect America's Freedoms-The Warmaking Powers, 1971 LAw AND SOCIAL ORDER
423.
Senator Dominick endeavored to substitute the language of a weaker House resolution
for the Senate bill, see note 26 infra, and introduced an amendment to increase the Presi-
dent's retaliatory powers. 118 CONG. REC. 11,902 (1972) (rejection of the amendment by a 37-
45 vote). Senator McGee proposed a national commission to examine foreign affairs commit-
ments in war powers and to evaluate the continued viability of the Constitution. See id. at
11,752 (rejection of the McGee proposal, 19 to 57).
Another unsuccessful effort against the Senate bill in 1972 was that of Senators Ervin and
Hruska, senior Members of the Judiciary Committee, to refer the bill to that Committee as
an attempt to amend the Constitution. See id. at 11,764 (26 to 60 rejection of proposal). A
study commission proposed by Senator Beall of Maryland was rejected also. See id. at 11,473
(rejection by 23-56 vote).
15. 118 CONG. REC. 11,610-17 (1972).
16. Id. at 12,610-11.
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The Senate action followed by two years the adoption of a war
powers resolution by the House of Representatives. 7 During the
summer of 1970, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Na-
tional Security Policy and Scientific Development considered 17
war powers bills and resolutions. After extensive hearings, the Sub-
committee drafted a joint resolution, 8 which was reported favorably
to the House by the Foreign Affairs Committee.'" Introduced on
August 13 by Congressman Clement Zablocki with 15 cosponsors,2
the joint resolution passed the House on November 16 by a 289-39
vote.2'
This resolution did not purport to define or change the constitu-
tional war powers of either the President or Congress. Its most sig-
nificant feature was its mandatory requirement for the President to
report promptly and in writing to Congress about the circumstan-
ces, authority, and estimated scope of activity for any commitment
of armed forces to conflict, commitment of armed forces abroad, or
substantial enlargement of armed forces abroad.22 No action having
been taken regarding the resolution by the Senate before the end of
the 91st Congress, however, the House proposal died upon adjourn-
ment.
When the 92d Congress convened, Congressman Zablocki wasted
no time in reintroducing his resolution.2 After additional hearings,
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs unanimously reported the
resolution to the House, which passed it by voice vote on August 2,
1971.24 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, having elected to
move toward codification of the circumstances and time limits
under which a President might commit armed forces to hostilities
without congressional authorization, was not receptive to the Za-
blocki resolution and, following Senate enactment of its own more
comprehensive bill,25 reported the Zablocki resolution adversely on
April 20.28 Upon receipt of the Senate bill, the House Foreign Affairs
17. Ha Res. No. 1547, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
18. H.R.J. Res. 1355, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
19. 118 CONG. Rxc. 26,645 (1972).
20. See 116 CONG. Rac. 28,887 (1970).
21. Id. at 37,407-08.
22. H.R. REP. No. 1547, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1970).
23. H.R.J. Res. 1, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
24. 117 CONG. Rc. 28,878 (1971).
25. S. 2956, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
26. S. REP. No. 755, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). On April 12, 1972, Senator Dominick
introduced an amendment, see 118 CONG. REc. 12,456 (1972), to substitute the text of H.R.J.
826 [Vol. 16:823
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Committee, substituted the title and text of the Zablocki resolution
in order that the Senate and House approaches to war powers legis-
lation might be brought to a conference committee. The House
passed the substitute overwhelmingly,2 and the Senate agreed to a
conference committee.2s With Congressmen poised to leave the Cap-
itol for the 1972 elections, however, the conferees recessed after one
rather desultory meeting, leaving war powers legislation for another
session of Congress.
It appears unlikely, however, that more prolonged conference ses-
sions could have produced an acceptable compromise because the
two proposals had little in common. The Senate majority viewed the
Zablocki resolution as too weak, while the House majority believed
that going beyond a mere reporting requirement could tie the Presi-
dent's hands in emergency situations. Nonetheless, the House hear-
ings of 1970 and the Senate hearings of 1971 produced a serious
examination of constitutional war powers." Following such pro-
longed ventilation of the various arguments, it appeared likely that
the 93d Congress would consider war powers legislation early and
explore methods of reconciling the House and Senate views to avoid
the unproductive deadlock of the 92d Congress. The long-running
Watergate controversy and the public reaction to the heavy bomb-
ing of North Vietnam during Christmas 1972 lent impetus to the
Res. 1, the Zablocld resolution, for the text of the Senate bill. It was rejected by vote of 53 to
24. 118 CONG. Rac. 12,458 (1972).
27. 118 CONG. REC. 28,079-83 (1972) (approval by a 345-13 vote).
28. Id. at 28,792-93. The conferees were Senators Fulbright, Church, Spong, Case, and
Javits, and Congressmen Morgan, Zabloeld, Hays, Fascell, Mailliard, Findley, and Frelin-
ghuysen.
29. The debate on the floor of Congress and in the committee rooms was augmented by
scholarly commentary. See Berger, War-making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 29
(1972); Bickel, The Constitution and the War, 54 CorumfNTARY 49 (1972); Eagleton, Congress
and War Powers, 37 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1972); Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. VA. L.
REv. 53 (1971); Fulbright, Congress, the President and the War Power, 25 ARK. L. Rav. 71
(1971); Goldwater, President's Ability to Protect America's Freedoms-The Warmaking
Powers, 1971 LAW AND Socim ORaE 423; Javits, Congress and the President: A Modem
Delineation of the War Powers, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 632 (1971); Lofgren, War-making Under
the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YAmm L. Rav. 672 (1972); Rogers, Congress,
the President, and the War Powers, 59 CALw. L. Rav. 1194 (1971); Rostow, Great Cases Make
Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TnxAs L. Rav. 833 (1972); Spong, CanBalance Be Restored
in the Constitutional WarPowers of the President and Congress?, 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1971);
Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for
Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1972); Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A
Critique, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 623 (1972).
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determination of the 93d Congress to fashion a legislative check
upon Presidential warmaking.
On the first day of the new Congress, Congressman Zablocki, with
11 cosponsors, introduced a stronger and broader version of his re-
porting resolution.0 Among the new features were a specification of
the circumstances which might permit emergency use of the armed
forces without a declaration of war,31 a call for immediate congres-
sional consideration of any report submitted to Congress under the
provisions of the resolution,12 'and a recitation that the resolution
was not intended to acknowledge that Presidential action alone
could satisfy the constitutional process requirements of national
security treaties. 3 Increased sentiment in the House for a stronger
resolution and the desire of the sponsors for serious bargaining with
the Senate prompted the stiffening additions.s The Zablocki sub-
committee conducted hearings in March, with the result that a new
committee resolution was introduced on May 3,5 reported by the
Foreign Affairs Committee on June 15,31 and passed by the House
with amendments on July 18 by a 244-170 vote.3 This House resolu-
tion eliminated from Congressman Zablocki's modified proposal the
specification of emergency uses of the armed forces, 3 itemized pro-
cedures for congressional response to a Presidential report,39 and
provided for priority consideration of any resolution or bill resulting
from such a report." It also strengthened the consultation language4'
30. H.R.J. Res. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
31. Id. § 3.
32. Id. § 6.
33. Id. § 7.
34. T. EAGLrrON, WAR AND PREsIDENTAL Pownn 146-47 (1974).
35. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
36. 119 CONG. REc. H4852 (daily ed. June 15, 1973).
37. 119 CONG. REc. H6283-84 (daily ed. July 18, 1973).
38. H.R.J. Res. 2, 93d Cong., lt Sess. § 3 (1973). See Hearings on WarPowers Before the
Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Development of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 80, 87 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on War
Powers].
39. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1973).
40. Id. § 5.
41. It is interesting to note the changing tone of the language concerning consultation with
Congress in the House resolutions from 1970 to 1973. The first resolution stated that it was
the sense of Congress that the President should seek consultation with Congress, "when
feasible." See note 17 supra. The second resolution eliminated the words "when feasible."
See note 23 supra. The third stated that the President should seek appropriate consultation.
See note 30 supra. The final House version provided: '"The President in every possible in-
stance shall consult with the leadership and appropriate committees of the Congress ..
See Appendix 6, § 2.
828 [Vol. 16:823
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and set a 72-hour limit for the President to report on military ac-
tions. initiated without a declaration of war.
The most significant additions to the Zablocki resolution, how-
ever, were sections 4(b) and 4(c). The former provided that the
President must terminate hostilities within 120 days unless Con-
gress had declared war or otherwise specifically authorized use of
armed forces.42 Section 4(c) provided that forces engaged in hostili-
ties outside the territorial limits of the United States or its posses-
sions or territories without a declaration of war or other specific
congressional authorization could be disengaged by Congress
through concurrent resolution.4 3
Narrowly rejected by the House was an attempt by Congressman
Whalen to amend section 4(b) to force an affirmative congressional
response to the Presidential use of force.4 As reported by the Foreign
Affairs Committee, the section required withdrawal of committed
forces or reduction of force enlargements within 120 days unless
Congress authorized the action or declared war." The practical
effect of this provision was to require the President to terminate
hostilities if Congress did not act. Congressman Whalen argued
that Congress should not be permitted to make such an important
policy decision by inaction and that his amendment would make
Congress face its responsibility for questions of war and peace.46
Defenders of the Committee's version of section 4(b) argued that
it would prevent thwarting of the will of a majority in favor of dis-
engagement by disagreement between the House and Senate, by
42. See Appendix 6, § 4(b). The Senate 30-day cutoff period in its 1972 bill had been the
focal point of much of the House opposition. The inclusion of a cutoff represented a change
of position by the House and provided an area for Senate-House reconciliation.
43. Id. § 4(c). Concurrent resolutions are not subject to Presidential veto and do not require
the President's signature. They traditionally have been used as a means to control or recover
powers delegated to the President by Congress. See notes 134-40 infra & accompanying text.
44. 119 CONG. REc. H6263 (daily ed. July 18, 1973).
45. The language of the Whalen amendment was as follows:
(b) Within one hundred and twenty calendar days after a report is submitted
or is required to be submitted (whichever is earlier) pursuant to Section 3, the
Congress, by a declaration of war or by the passage of a resolution appropriate
to the purpose, shall either approve, ratify, confirm, and authorize the continua-
tion of the action taken by the President and reported to the Congress, or shall
disapprove such action in which case the President shall terminate any commit-
ment and remove any enlargement of United States Armed Forces with respect
to which such report was submitted.
Id.
46. Id. at H6263-65.
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a Senate filibuster, or by a Presidential veto that could be upheld
by a mere one-third of either House; the amendment would create
an undesirable presumption in favor of Presidential action, they
argued.47 By a slim 211-200 margin, the House rejected the
Whalen amendment. 8
The Senate moved almost as rapidly as the House at the begin-
ning of the 93d Congress. On January 18, Senator Javits, for himself
and 57 other Senators, introduced a war powers bill, entitled the
War Powers Act,49 which was-identical to the.bill that had passed
the Senate in April 1972. It was advocated by its chief sponsor as a
constructive alternative to legislative control over the use of armed
forces by means of the appropriations power, which was described
as a "clumsy, blunt, and obsolescent tool." ' Senators Stennis and
Eagleton were again principal cosponsors of the bill, although the
former's participation was limited during the early debate. 1 Despite
Senator Eagleton's belief that the anticipated withdrawal of United
States forces from South Vietnam justified removing the exemption
the bill gave to Indochina hostilities,- the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee reported the bill unamended and without dissent to the Sen-
ate in June. 3
Both the House and Senate war powers debates took place in July
against a background that cannot be divorced from an account of
legislative history. A complicated and continuing struggle over use
of the ultimate congressional weapon, the power of the purse, to stop
air operations over Cambodia had preceded the July war powers
debate. These air strikes were ordered by the President in response
to failure of the North Vietnamese to withdraw forces from Laos and
Cambodia. Concurrently, further disclosures about the break-in at
the Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate were eroding
47. Id. at H6265-70.
48. Id. at H6263-72.
49. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
50. 119 CONG. Rc. S871 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1973). Senator Javits' introductory remarks
included an observation that Congressman Zablocki's revised resolution contained "signifi-
cant new elements bringing it closer to the Senate bill." Id.
51. In late January 1973, Senator Stennis was the victim of a robbery and assault during
which he was shot. He recovered sufficiently to participate in the October and.November 1973
debates concerning the conference report and override of the President's veto. Senator Stennis
spoke for adoption of the conference report and for override of the veto. 119 CoNG. REC.
S20,096 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973); id. at S18,996-97 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973).
52. T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at 147-48. Section 9 of the bill recited: "This Act shall
• . . not apply to hostilities in which the Armed Forces of the United States are involved on
the effective date of this Act."
53. 119 CONG. Rac. 811,123 (daily ed. June 14, 1973).
[Vol. 16:823
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public support for President Nixon. Nevertheless, despite the
steady decline in his personal popularity and in his capacity to
influence Congress, the President's veto power appeared secure. 5
During a three-day debate, the Senate by voice votd accepted
several perfecting amendments, including an Eagleton amendment
to make the bill applicable to all hostilities as of its enactment. Two
amendments offered by Senator Fulbright were rejected by voice
vote.5" The only controversial amendment introduced, debated, and
defeated by recorded vote was an Eagleton amendment to limit the
use of American civilian combatants in the same manner as the use
of military force." Opposed by Senators Javits, Muskie, and Sten-
nis,57 the amendment was rejected," and the bill passed the Senate
54. Congress had sustained several vetoes by President Nixon during 1972 and 1973. See,
e.g., 119 CoNG. REc. S19,763-68 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1973) (veto of bill authorizing fiscal 1974
appropriations for the United States Information Agency (USIA) with a provision for congres-
sional access to certain USIA documents); 119 CONG. REc. H5486-88 (daily ed. June 27,1973)
(veto of a supplemental appropriations bill with a provision barring use of funds for continued
bombing of Cambodia); 119 Cong. Rec. S6509-38 (daily ed. Apr. 3,1973) (veto of amendment
to vocational rehabilitation bill).
55. One amendment would have authorized Congress to prohibit peacetime deployment
of troops outside of the United States; another would have changed the conditions under
which the President would be permitted to make emergency use of the armed forces. 29 CoNG.
Q. AumAnc 914 (1973). Both amendments were consistent with positions takeri by Senator
Fulbright in the supplemental views stated by him when the Committee reported to the
Senate. See S. RP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 33-38 (1973).
56. Senator Eagleton referred to this as his "CIA Amendment." It was prompted, in large
measure, by CIA activities in Laos. Senator Eagleton feared that such operations would be
encouraged in the future so long as the fact of civilian control was sufficient to take them
outside the scope of the Resolution. 119. CONG. Ruc. S14,187-88 (daily ed. July 20, 1973).
57. Senators Javits and Muskie sympathized with the purpose behind the Eagleton
amendment concerning CIA operations, but both feared that the amendment could impair
chances for passage of the Resolution. During the debate, Senator Muskie introduced a letter
he had received from Senator Stennis; portions of the Stennis letter read as follows:
One amendment of substance [to the War Powers Bill] is by. . .Mr. Eagle-
ton, who has done much work and has made a fine contribution to this impor-
tant bill as it now stands. This amendment has a prohibition of using the C.I.A.,
or its funds, in war activities of the type we have used in Laos. The experience
of the C.I.A. in Laos, as well as more recent disclosures of matters here at home
have caused me to definitely conclude that the entire C.I.A. Act should be fully
reviewed.
Accordingly, I already have in mind plans for such a review of the C.I.A. Act
by the Senate Armed Services Committee and have already started some staff
work thereon. All proposed changes, additions or deletions can be fully devel-
oped and hearings held thereon at that time. I have already completed, but have
not yet introduced some amendments of my own. The proposal by the Senator
from Missouri, Mr. Eagleton, to explicitly prohibit any action by the C.I.A. of
the type we have had in Laos, or any other activity of that kind could & would
1975]
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with three floor amendments by a 72 to 18 vote. 9
Since the House had passed the revised Zablocki resolution two
days previously, 0 the way was clear for a conference committeel'
that had better prospects than its predecessor. In the words of one
conferee, "a sense of historic opportunity and responsibility per-
vaded.""2 Elements of both measures provided a basis for discussion
and compromise; though the approaches of each body differed, they
were not as irreconcilable as they had been in 1972. Both Houses
had embraced a proposal to tdrminate the President's authority to
use forces abroad, the Senate allowing 30 days 3 and the House,
120.64 Each House also had empowered Congress to order earlier
cessation of combat activity or deployment, the Senate utilizing a
joint resolution and the House, a concurrent resolution. 5
The most fundamental difference to be resolved concerned the
triggering of the 30- or 120-day period allowed for the President to
obtain congressional approval for his deployment of the armed
forces. From the first war powers legislation introduced by Senator
Javits,6' the Senate consistently had specified the emergency situa-
tions which would permit Presidential commitment of forces with-
out particular congressional authority. Congressman Zablocki's
brief flirtation with this so-called "authority" approach had re-
be fully considered by the committee at that time. I could support some major
points in that particular amendment as a part of a bill on the subject, but fully
oppose the amendment presented as a part of the War Powers Bill.
The bill now before the Senate, as finally written and improved by the Foreign
Relations Committee, is an excellent bill ard is confined to the Constitutional
subject of actually committing the nation to war.
I believe this bill, if confined to its proper subject matter will pass the Senate
by a large vote and will emerge from the Conference Committee as a bill with
meaning. . . .If we clutter the War Powers Bill with other matters we would
probably kill what is otherwise a good chance to override a possible veto.
119 CoNG. Rac. S14,190 (daily ed. July 20, 1973).
58. Id. at 14,200 (rejected by 34-18 vote).
59. Id. at 14,226.
60. See note 37 supra.
61. The conferees were Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, Symington, Muskie, Aiken, Case
and Javits, and Congressmen Zablocki, Morgan, Hays, Fraser, Fascell, Mailliard, Findley,
and Broomfield. 119 CONG. REc. H8657 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1973).
62. 119 CONG. REC. S18,986 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) (remarks of Senator Javits).
63. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Seass. § 5 (1973).
64. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b) (1973).
65. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Ses. § 6 (1973); H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. § 4(c)
(1973).
66. S. 3964, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). There were no hearings on the bill during the 91st
Congress.
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ceived short shrift from his committee colleagues in the House" who
favored a "performance" test. Under the House test the 120-day
period would begin to run when the President reported to Congress
within 72 hours after having deployed the armed forcei, whereas
under the Senate's "authority" test the 30-day period would begin
to run upon deployment of the troops. The House conferees argued
that an attempt to delineate the President's warmaking powers spe-
cifically was "constitutionally questionable and from a practical
standpoint unwise""8 and that language in the Senate bill giving the
President the right to forestall an attack could license preemptive
war. 69
The compromise version reported to the respective bodies by the
conferees70 embraced the House method of triggering a 60-day pe-
riod during which the President might commit United States forces
without specific congressional iuthorization, and allowed a 30-day
extension if the President certified in writing that the time is needed
for the safety of the troops. 71 The time within which the President
must report to the Speaker and President Pro Tempore of the Sen-
ate was set at 48 hours.7 2 The conferees retained the provision that
would empower Congress to terminate a Presidential action within
the 60-day period by concurrent resolution. The cutoff period does
not begin to run unless the President's report is made pursuant to
the introduction of troops into actual or clearly imminent hostilities.
Priority consideration was authorized for joint and concurrent reso-
lutions to extend or shorten the 60-day period, and the language
interpreting provisions of the resolution was compromised.'
Most difficult to compromise was the Senate's desire to enumer-
ate the emergency exercises of the President's war powers that
would trigger the need for Congressional approval. 3 After the House
conferees rejected the Senate's definition of those powers,74 Senator
Javits proposed new language to preserve the Senate's minimum
essentials5 :
67. See note 38 supra & accompanying text.
68. 119 CoNG. REc. H8948 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1973).
69. Id. at H8949.
70. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
71. 119 CONG. REc. H8656 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1973).
72. Id.
73. See 119 CONG. REC. S18,985 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) (statement of Senator Fulbright,
conference chairman).
74. See Appendix 7, § 3.
75. T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at 201.
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The emergency powers of the President to introduce the United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or situations likely to lead
to hostilities being to (1) repel attacks upon the United States,
its territories and possessions; (2) defend the United States
Armed Forces abroad from attack; (3) rescue citizens and na-
tionals of the United States; in any case in which the United
States Armed Forces without a declaration of war by the Con-
gress, or specific prior statutory authorization are introduced."
Finding the new Javits language unacceptable, the conferees com-
promised by placing the following language in section 2, the "Pur-
poses and Policy" section:
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-
in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory au-
thorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon
the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces.7
Arguments from earlier debates were revived in the course of ob-
taining Senate and House approval of the conference report. Among
the Congressmen opposed to the report was the House Minority
Leader, Gerald R. Ford, who decried the lack of a requirement for
Congress to act affirmatively, stating: "We will stop a war by sitting
on our hands and doing nothing."78 Notably, the then Representa-
tive Ford also stated that he saw validity to the argument that the
report expanded the President's warmaking authority.79 Another
opponent of the report was one of the architects of war powers legis-
lation, Senator Eagleton, who objected that placing the language of
section 2(c) into the "Purpose and Policy" section rendered the
language precatory, meaningless, and "the pious pronouncement of
nothing."80 He argued that the conferees intended this effect, citing
the following statement from the conference report: "Subsequent
sections of the joint resolution are not dependent upon the language
of [section 2(c)], as was the case with a similar provision of the
76. Id.
77. 119 CONG. REc. H8656-57 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1973).
78. 119 CoNG. Rac. H8957 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1973).
79. Id.
80. 119 CONG. Rzc. S18,992 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973).
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Senate bill. .. ."s' He reasoned that if section 2(c) was nonopera-
tive, then the President was free to define his own war powers, the
Resolution thereby effectively sanctioning a period of 60 to 90 days
of war declared by the President and creating a legal base for the
President to take the nation to war without prior congressional au-
thorization. 82 The Senate, nevertheless, agreed to the conference
report on October 10 by a substantial majority of 75 to 2 0 ,ss the
House concurring two days later by a 238-123 vote."
On October 24, to no one's surprise, President Nixon vetoed the
War Powers Resolution." In a telegram introduced during the House
debate of the Zablocki resolution on July 18 by then House Minority
Leader Ford, President Nixon had stated that he was "unalterably
opposed to and must veto any bill containing the dangerous and
unconstitutional restrictions found in sections [5(b) and 5(c)] of
this bill."86 Since these sections had survived the conference sub-
stantially intact, President Nixon's veto only fulfilled the general
expectation that any war powers legislation containing more than a
reporting requirement probably would be vetoed.
Although that prospect had presented little problem in theSenate
where the key votes in 1972 and 1973 all had indicated sufficient
support for war powers legislation to override a veto, 7 supporters of
the measure had urged the President to consider a veto cautiously.
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey had contended: "If vetoed, all of the
pious words about bipartisanship and shared power will be lost in a
Presidential pronouncement reinforcing the concept of unchecked
power."ss Nevertheless, the President's veto message stated that the
War Powers Resolution "would attempt to take away. . . authori-
ties which the President has properly exercised under the Constitu-
tion for almost 200 years."89 He objected specifically to section 5(b)
which "would automatically cut off certain authorities after sixty
81. H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1973).
82. 119 CONG. REC. S18,993 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973).
83. Id. at S19,006.
84. 119 CoNo. REc. H8963 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1973).
85. H.R. Doc. No. 171, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
86. 119 CONG. REC. H6241 (daily ed. July 18, 1973).
87. See 118 CONG. REc. 12,611-12 (1972) (68-16 approval of Senate bill); 119 CONG. REc.
S14,226 (daily ed. July 20, 1973) (72-18 approval of Senate bill); 119 CoNG. REc. S19,006
(daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) (72-18 approval of conference report despite the opposition of Senator
Eagleton and the "House flavor" of the compromise).
88. 119 CoNG. REc. S18,989 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973).
89. 119 CoNG. Pac. H9400 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1973).
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days unless the Congress extended them."'9 Another objection con-
cerned section 5(c), which "would allow the Congress to eliminate
certain authorities merely by the passing of a concurrent resolu-
tion-an action which does not normally have the force of law, since
it denies the President his constitutional role in approving legisla-
tion." In addition to his constitutional objections, the President
asserted that the Resolution would undermine national foreign pol-
icy and criticized the absence of a requirement that the Congress
act affirmatively in order to terminate the President's constitutional
powers as Commander-in-Chief after 60 days.92
Because less than a two-thirds majority had voted for the confer-
ence report in the House, 3 there was a possibility that the House
would sustain the veto. Despite opposition to the War Powers Reso-
lution on the grounds that it either went too far or not far enough
in checking the President's powers;, however, background factors
undoubtedly contributed to the House vote on the veto. Democrats
had a political reason to override the veto to reassert their strength
after the House had sustained five successive vetoes during 1973.11
The vote also had been converted into a test of congressional against
executive power by the public dissatisfaction with the continued
struggle in Vietnam and Cambodia. Finally, the dismissal of Water-
gate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, the resulting resignation of
Attorney General Elliot Richardson, and the growing White House
tapes controversy fostered partisanship among Democrats while
leading some House Republicans to want to disassociate themselves
from the President.
The House overrode the President's veto by only four votes more
than a two-thirds majority. 5 Fifteen members who voted for the
conference report nonetheless voted to sustain, ten Republicans per-
haps motivated by party loyalty and five Democrats. 6 On the other
hand, 18 who had opposed the conference report voted to override
the veto,97 although some of these had been quite outspoken in oppo-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See note 84 supra & accompanying text.
94. See 29 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 28 (1973).
95. 119 CoNG. REC. H9661 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973) (284-135 vote to override).
96. 29 CONO. Q. ALMANAC 905 (1973).
97. Id.
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sition to war powers legislation." While only 361 Congressmen had
voted on the conference report, 419 voted on the veto, with a sub-
stantial majority of the 58 new votes contributing to the margin
needed to override.
A long, complicated legislative battle ended when the House vote
to override was followed, as expected, by Senate agreement." For
those who believed history had been made by the votes, the Resolu-
tion, despite its diverse origins, represented a major beginning to-
ward restoring balance between the executive and legislative
branches.' Adoption of the Resolution, nevertheless, did not an-
swer forever some of the criticisms directed at the conference com-
promise. A review of these will facilitate evaluation of the efficacy
of the Resolution.
THE LEGAL MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Statutory Interpretation of Section 2(c)
In examining the effect of section 2(c), it is appropriate to apply
Justice Holmes' test: "We do not inquire what the legislature
meant; we ask only what the statute means."'0 ' Language of the
section presents no difficult problem, for the words are relatively
clear and unambiguous; the placement of the language in the "Pur-
poses and Policy" section of the Resolution, however, does raise a
question as to its effect. Technically the "Purpose and Policy" sec-
tion of the Resolution is not a preamble, since although it might
have been drafted in the form of "whereas" clauses, it was not. It
follows the enacting clause and, as part of the body of the Resolu-
tion, must be interpreted together with all other sections according
to the maxim that the "separate effect of each individual part or
section of an act [must be] made consistent with the whole."102
If section 2(c) is operative, it still is necessary to determine
98. An intensive effort was made by the Americans for Democratic Action to change the
views of eleven Representatives who had voted against the War Powers Resolution when the
House considered it initially and in the form of the conference report. Of the eleven, five,
Representatives Abzug, Drinan, Hechler, Holtzman, and Patten, voted to override the veto.
Id. at 906.
99. 119 CoNo. REc. S20,115 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973) (75-18 vote to override).
100. J. JAvrrs, WHO MAKES Wan? at v-xi (1973) (forewords by Barbara Tuchman and
Alexander M. Bickel).
101. 0. HoutEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920).
102. 2A C. SAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCION § 47.06, at 81 (4th ed. 1973)
(footnote omitted).
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whether it has a binding effect upon the President's actions as
Commander-in-Chief. Ambiguities arise from the specific wording
of the subsection, particularly as it relates to the other subsections
of the "Purposes and Policy" section and to other sections of the
Resolution. For instance, the words "are exercised" in section 2(c)
are present-tense words followed by the congressional statement of
the constitutional standards for the exercise of Presidential war-
making powers. The words are stronger than words of "finding"
("the Congress finds that . . ."), yet they are not directive. The
word "shall" is omitted, despite its appearance in every subsequent
section of the Resolution. Moreover, the uniqueness of the subsec-
tion is emphasized by the fact that the language of the two
preceding subsections"0 3 clearly is prefatory, subsection (a) stating
the purpose of the Resolution and subsection (b) citing the "neces-
sary and proper" clause of the Constitution as the legal basis for the
Resolution. In contrast to this prefatory language is the phrase "are
exercised only" in subsection (c) and the precision with which it
delineates the situations when the President may introduce United
States forces into hostilities.
Contrasting with the specificity of the enumeration of the emer-
gency situations in which the President may commit forces is the
absence from section 2(c) of any enforcing language and, more criti-
cally, the lack of any reference to section 2(c) by any other section
of the Resolution.' 4 Rather than limiting the President's use of force
by reference to section 2(c), the enforcing provision of the Resolu-
tion, section 4, only requires the President to report to Congress
upon the commitment of forces in certain enumerated situations.
This lack of harmony between sections 2(c) and 4 is not resolved by
the conference report observation"0 5 that subsequent sections of the
Resolution are not dependent upon section 2(c),10 for this observa-
tion merely states what is readily apparent from a reading of the
Resolution. Moreover, the nondirective conference report observa-
tions could not overcome the following fundamental principle of
103. All three subsections obviously were drawn from sections 2 and 3 of the Senate bill,
S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 3 (1973). See Appendix 7.
104. The section defining emergency situations in the Senate bill was referred to as an
integral part of the legislation in the other vital sections of the bill. See Appendix 7.
105. See note 81 supra & accompanying text.
106. The subsequent provisions of the Senate bill, on the other hand, were dependent upon
section 3, the provision of the Senate bill that corresponded to section 2(c) of the joint
resolution. See note 104 supra.
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statutory construction: "[A] statute is passed as a whole and not
in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and
intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in
connection with every other part or section so as to produce a har-
monious whole."'0 7 Furthermore, the question addressed, however
successfully, by the conference report was whether other sections
depend upon section 2(c), not the present question of whether the
meaning of section 2(c) depends upon subsequent sections.
To Senator Eagleton's charge that section 2(c) is meaningless,
Senator Javits merely adduced the litany that a statute is passed
as a whole and each part should be construed with every other part
to produce a harmonious whole.0 8 A reading of section 2(c) with
section 4 or any of the other procedural sections, however, makes
harmonious interpretation difficult. Neither the language of the
conference report nor the attempt to relate sections 2(c) and 4 re-
solves the effect of section 2(c) upon the President's authority as
Commander-in-Chief. That question must be resolved by reexami-
nation of the words of the subsection.
Conflicting possibilities for determining whether section 2(c) is
mandatory are offered by the wording of the section. One rule of
construction provides that mandatory statutes state both the activ-
ity prescribed and the consequence of failure to perform."9 Applica-
tion of this rule would suggest that 2(c) is not mandatory and thus
not binding upon the President. Another rule, leading to a contrary
conclusion, is that statutory language indicating that a prescribed
course is to be exclusive is mandatory: "The rule is that if, by the
language used, a thing is limited to be done in a particular form or
manner, it includes a [requirement] that it shall not be done other-
wise, and that an affirmative expression introductive of a new rule
implies a negative of all that is not within its purview.""o 0 The use
of the word "only" in section 2(c) thus could imply a basis for
107. 2A C. SAND, supra note 102, § 46.05, at 56 (footnote omitted).
108. He stated: "If this is a statute, every part means something, whether it is written in
subsection (2)(c) or in section 3, as in the Senate bill." 119 CoNG. REc. S18,994 (daily ed.
Oct. 10, 1973). However, other statements made by Senator Javits during the debate that
day made clear his preference for the Senate language: "I would prefer the Senate version.
There is no question about it .... Unfortunately, that version could not pass both Houses."
Id,
109. 2A C. SAND, supra note 102, § 57.08.
110. Id. § 57.09, at 427.
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bringing the section within the ambit of the latter rule as a limit on
executive power.
There is little or no support for an implied limitation in the legis-
lative history of the Resolution, however. Courts also are unlikely
to find implied limitations in legislation that could affect vitally the
distribution of authority between the executive and legislative
branches of government, particularly since the. legislative history
supports reading section 2(c) as only advisory to the President. Sec-
tion 3 of the Senate bill used mandatory language in describing the
authority of the Commander-in-Chief,"1 while the intended
strength of the language of subsection 2(c), the product of confer-
ence compromise, is unclear and not accompanied by enforcement
provisions. The difference between the two versions is significant,
for "[w]here the history of the bill in the legislation shows that
when it was originally introduced it contained a permissive verb,
and that when finally passed it had been changed to one of manda-
tory import, or vice versa, it is clear that the verb used in the bill
as it was finally passed was intended to carry its ordinary mean-
ing."112
From its legislative history, section 2(c) must be viewed as the
remnant of the Senate's long effort to define the President's war
powers in emergency situations. That effort failed. It cannot be
stated summarily that the section is inoperative, for it follows the
"be it resolved" clause, but its effectiveness is limited to the advi-
sory impact its words may have upon a President. It does not bind
the President, but it stands as the only statement of what Congress
believes the President's war powers authority to be. There may be
instances involving protection of American nationals abroad, inter-
national peace-keeping, or humanitarian rescue in which there is
constitutional authority for the President to disregard the advisory
language of section 2(c), but the language could influence a Presi-
dent to turn to Congress before acting even in emergency situations.
The fact that Congress will have to approve a Presidential initiative
111. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973).
112. 2A C. SAND, supra note 102, § 57.05, at 419 (footnote omitted).
113. The Department of State, in response to a query from Senator Eagleton, had been
prompt to state: ". . . Section 2(c) does not constitute a legally binding definition of the
President's Constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief." 119 CONG. REc. S20,051 (daily ed.
Nov. 7, 1973). See Letter from Senator Thomas Eagleton to Secretary of State Henry Kissin-
ger and Reply from Marshall Wright, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, id.
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within 60 days and may disapprove it by concurrent resolution at
any time should encourage the President to consult before acting.
Senator Muskie, floor manager of the Senate bill and a conferee,
expressed the following view of the section:
It is true, as [Senator Eagleton] has pointed out, that this
language is not operative language.
Why was it put into the bill?
It was put into the bill as an indication that, in enacting a bill,
Congress did not intend to surrender any of its constitutional
powers with respect to the making of war.
The remainder of the bill is a procedural bill, undertaken to
insure consultation by the President with Congress and under-
taking to put in the hands of Congress the procedure for termi-
nating any hostilities into which the President may have
plunged us, whether or not his action in so doing conformed with
our view as to what his constitutional powers might be.'
The Constitutional Issues
The constitutional questions presented by the War Powers Reso-
lution are easier to identify than to answer. They were raised during
the war powers debates, both by those who argued that war powers
legislation infringed upon the President's constitutional preroga-
tives and by those who believed that the legislation proposed would
give the President greater authority in warmaking decisions than
that granted by the Constitution. An evaluation of the Resolution
in terms of these questions, however, must be shaded by an ac-
knowledgment that the purpose of the Resolution accepted was not
to define constitutional powers, but to establish procedures gover-
ning their exercise.115
The initial constitutional question concerns whether section 2(c)
114. 119 CONG. Rc. S20,112 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973).
115. Senator Muskie stated:
The bill does not undertake to impose on the President a modification of his
constitutional powers. It does not undertake to assert a restatement of Congress'
view as to the President's role with respect to the warmaking power.
What it undertakes to do is to establish a procedure for comity as to different
views in the future, so that Congress can be brought in from the periphery of
the warmaking power to its center in order to exercise its proper role.
Id. With this statement, Senator Muskle identified succinctly the basic difference between
the Senate's authority approach and the House's performance approach. The latter approach,
adopted by the conference, does not include binding constitutional definitions of war powers
authority and, as a result, raises fewer constitutional questions.
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infringes upon the President's authority to act in emergencies for
the protection of American nationals abroad. One constitutional
scholar, Professor Bickel, gave wide scope to this authority by term-
ing it "somewhat extra-constitutional; ""I nevertheless, he acknowl-
edged that the delineation of that authority advocated by the Sen-
ate proposals comported with "the contemplation of the framers of
the American Constitution and . . the experience of nearly two
centuries, including a quarter century of the nuclear age. ... "111
In light of the procedural purpose of the Resolution, the concept
of the President's authority reflected in section 2(c) as enacted does
not infringe upon that authority, however it is defined. If it is correct
to construe section 2(c) as advisory only, rather than mandatory,
the power of the President to act unilaterally to protect American
nationals is not questioned. The sections of the Resolution pertinent
to the exercise of this power are those following section 2; the Presi-
dent's immediate duty is to consult, if possible, and to report to
Congress, if section 4(1), (2), or (3) is applicable.118 Moreover, the
Senate bill's specific definition of the situations in which the Presi-
dent might make emergency use of the armed forces' accommo-
dated cases decided in the 19th century which established the right
of the President to use the armed forces abroad for the protection
of American nationals.'20
Another possible source of infringement upon Presidential power
is the imposition by section 5(b) of a 60-day limitation upon the use
of the armed forces without congressional sanction. The most elo-
quent opposition to this cutoff clause was that of Senator Sam
Ervin:
This measure is an absurdity. It says that when the United
States is invaded, Armed Forces of the United States must get
out of the fight against an invader at the end of 30 days if the
Congress does not take affirmative action within that time to
authorize the President to continue to employ the Armed Forces
to resist the invasion. The bill is not only unconstitutional, but
is also impractical of operation. In short, it is an absurdity.
116. Hearings on War Powers, supra note 38, at 178 (testimony of Alexander Bickel).
117. Id.
118. Appendix 1, §§ 2, 4.
119. See S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973); Appendix 7.
120. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
(dictum); Perrin v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 315 (1870).
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Under it, the President must convert Old Glory into a white flag
within 30 days if Congress does not expressly authorize him to
perform the duty the Constitution imposes upon him to protect
the Nation against invasion."'
He added: "[I think] that the Founding Fathers were acting in
great wisdom when they separated the powers of Government by
making one public official, the President of the United States, the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
rather than 100 Senators and 435 Representatives. 1 2
Senator Ervin's argument draws upon the extreme example of an
invasion to question the validity of the Resolution. There is little
doubt that the Founding Fathers intended one commander, rather
than a collegium, to be responsible for the military and tactical
decisions of war;12 3 Elbridge Gerry's successful motion to insert the
word "declare" in place of "make" in article I, section 8, clause 11
of the Constitution, pointedly left to the President the power to
repel sudden attacks if Congress was not in session. ' , Embracing
the Ervin argument fully, however, would lead to the conclusion
that Congress does not have the authority to terminate hostilities
in the United States, contrary to the wishes of the President, if it
believes such termination in the best interests of the Nation. This
conclusion clashes with the principle that the power vested in Con-
gress to declare war includes the authority to choose peace instead
of war.125 To interpret the Constitution as providing the President
with sole authority to terminate hostilities is to disregard the wis-
dom of James Madison's admonition: "Those who are to conduct a
war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether
a war ought to be commenced, continued or concluded."126
Consideration of the 60-day cutoff provision requires a broader
perspective than the extreme example of an invasion. The constitu-
tional basis of war powers legislation for the entire Resolution, and
particularly the cutoff provision, section 5(b), is recited in section
2(b):
121. 119 CONG. PEc. S14,201 (daily ed. July 20, 1973).
122. Id.
123. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615, 618 (1850); Tm FEDELIST No. 69
(A. Hamilton).
124. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 476 (1966).
125. L. HENKN, FOREIN AFFAmS AND THE CONSTuTON 107-08 (1972).
126. Helvidius Letter No. 1, ch. II, n.12, quoted in L. HENKIN, supra note 125, at 351 n.48.
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Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically
provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all
laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only
its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any depart-
ment or officer thereof."'
Senator Muskie's view"' and the language of the Resolution it-
self 29 suggests that the necessary-and-proper clause serves as the
basis for creating a procedural mechanism for coordinating the con-
stitutional authorities of the President and Congress. The Resolu-
tion also might be deemed a legislative attempt to fill the lacuna
resulting from the constitutional structure that gives Congress the
authority to declare war and to raise, organize, and support the
armed forces, but that names the President as Commander-in-
Chief. This procedure would provide an alternative to use of the
congressional power of the purse to terminate hostilities and would
encourage early consultation when hostilities are imminent. The
procedure would permit the President to initiate hostilities unilater-
ally, but he must consult with Congress and, if the armed forces are
employed in circumstances described in section 4(a),'30 report to
Congress. If he reports pursuant to section 4(a) (1), the 60-day period
begins to run for Congress to respond positively or negatively as to
the necessity and wisdom of the President's action. Failure to act
within the 60 days would constitute a negative response, and it must
be assumed that both the President and Congress would be sensitive
to the political risks of unilateral presidential action or congres-
sional inaction.
Whether the 60-day cutoff infringes upon the President's con-
stitutional authority is related to how one views the Commander-
in-Chief. Is the President's role that of Hamilton's first general
and admiral or the Abraham Lincoln of the Prize Cases'3' or
an all-powerful commander who acts with unenumerated, extra-
127. Appendix 1, § 2(b); of. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 18.
128. See note 115 supra.
129. Appendix 1, § 8(d)(1).
130. Id. § 4(a).
131. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (acknowledging the limited authority of the President to
recognize and react appropriately to the fact of territorial war despite his inability to initiate
war). An even more confining interpretation of the President's authority as Commander-in-
Chief would view him as simply the highest ranking military officer. See THE FEDERAsT No.
69 (A. Hamilton).
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constitutional authority termed "inherent"? The conferees on the
Resolution rejected the attempt to codify the constitutional war
powers of the Commander-in-Chief, electing instead to recite in
advisory language their view of what those powers comprise. Against
that background, the cutoff provision is constitutional in concept,
athough there may be occasions when its execution could be uncon-
stitutional. Congress recognized the possibility of unconstitutional
execution by including language in section 5 allowing the President
to certify "unavoidable military necessity" in order to receive an
additional 30 days for military operations if such continued use of
the armed forces is necessary to protect the safety of forces during
withdrawal.1 12 The tactical duty of a commander to provide for the
safety of the troops in the field could render the cutoff period uncon-
stitutional were it not for the saving provision in the Resolution
for a necessary extension to allow the Commander-in-Chief to per-
form this tactical duty.
Conversely, it has been argued that section 5(b) is an impermissi-
ble expansion, rather than restriction, of the President's constitu-
tional authority as Commander-in-Chief since it might permit him
to wage war unilaterally for 60 to 90 days. The basic purpose of the
Resolution was to establish a procedure for the exercise of war pow-
ers by the President and Congress, not to reduce, expand, or even
define in a binding fashion these powers. Although section 2(c)
states in advisory language Congress' view of the President's war
powers and does not bind the President to this view, actions taken
beyond the parameters of section 2(c) under any of the circumstan-
ces enumerated in section 4 will require consultation and reporting
pursuant to other provisions of the Resolution. If section 4(a)(1)
provides the basis for requiring the report, the 60-day cutoff provi-
sion applies as well as the provision permitting congressional termi-
nation through concurrent resolution.
The Resolution does not add to the President's authority as
Commander-in-Chief. Indeed, considering the expansion of that
authority during the past quarter-century through custom, usage,
and congressional acquiescence, there is little power to add. The
Resolution does establish by law a methodology by which Congress
may terminate hostilities it considers unwise or unconstitutional
without resort to the ultimate legislative weapon of withholding
132. See Appendix 1, § 5(b).
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funds, an unsuitably harsh remedy employed only reluctantly.
Opponents of the War Powers Resolution also asserted the exist-
ence of constitutional infirmities in the provision under section 5(c)
for termination of hostilities by concurrent resolution, which does
not require signature by the President and thus is not subject to
veto. Arguing to sustain the President's veto, Senator Strom Thur-
mond stated:
[The Resolution] eliminates certain authorities merely by the
passage of a concurrent resolution. Now, what is a concurrent
resolution? A concurrent resolution is one that merely takes the
sense of the bodies. How can a concurrent resolution have the
force and effect of law? How could the President of the United
States be denied the right to veto a resolution that would carry
such tremendous power as this concurrent resolution would ap-
parently do?
A joint resolution does have the force and effect of law, and
the President has the chance to veto it, but for the Congress,
through a concurrent resolution, to act in a matter on such a
vast scale as this, affecting the Constitution of the United
States, there is no parallel in history for such a procedure. There
is no precedent in the history of this Government for such a
procedure.'
Precedents exist, however, for the use of concurrent resolutions.
Among notable pieces of legislation in which Congress or the Senate
has provided for the use of such resolutions are the Executive
Reorganization Acts of 193914 and 1949,35 the Greek-Turkish Aid
Act of 1947'11 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,' 37 the Lend Lease
Act, ' one of Henry Cabot Lodge's reservations to the Versailles
Treaty,' and ironically the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.14 One of the
possible exceptions to the authority of Congress to terminate hostili-
ties concerns the defense against invasion by the President,"' but
133. 119 CONG. REc. S20,108 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973).
134. Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, § 5(a), 53 Stat. 562.
135. Reorganization Act of 1949, ch. 226, § 6(a), 63 Stat. 205.
136. An Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, ch. 81, § 6, 61 Stat. 105 (1947),
repealed by Mutual Security Act, ch. 937, § 542(a)(1), 68 Stat. 861 (1954).
137. Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 617, 75 Stat. 444.
138. Ch. 11, § 3(c), 55 Stat. 32 (1941).
139. 58 CONG. REc. 8022 (1919) (Reservation No. 2).
140. Pub. L. No. 88408, § 3, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
141. See L. HN~rN, supra note 125.
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it is acknowledged by section 5(c) which permits the concurrent-
resolution procedure only when ". . United States Armed Forces
are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States,
its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or spe-
cific statutory authorization ...."I"
Use of a concurrent resolution, rather than a joint resolution, as
a mode for terminating hostilities should be weighed constitution-
ally in terms of depriving the President of a voice in the termination
decision that he otherwise would have through the right to veto a
joint resolution. Such a joint resolution, however, would place the
decision for war or peace in the hands of one-third of each house,
since the President could continue to wage war until Congress
achieved a two-third majority in both houses. Section 5(c) applies
to situations in which the President has initiated hostilities without
a declaration of war or other congressional sanction; its concurrent-
resolution procedure assures that his intiative has approximately
the same legislative support that would be required for engagement
in hostilities if the time pressures of an emergency did not prevent
seeking approval from Congress before committing troops."'
Case law provides some support for the use of concurrent resolu-
tions, although the courts have not explicated the permissible use
fully. 4' One early case held that a concurrent resolution not requir-
ing approval by the President was a proper vehicle for a proposed
amendment to the Constitution." Professor Corwin, in his discus-
sion of legislative delegation of powers, indicated approval of the use
of concurrent resolutions, citing several uses of the device by Con-
gress since adoption of the Constitution.' The weight of authority
142. Appendix 1, § 5(c) (emphasis supplied).
143. W. Taylor Reveley III and Raoul Berger provided an excellent discussion of this point
at the hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 15, 1973. Hearings on
War Powers, supra note 38, at 256-57. Mr. Reveley pointed out that before the President has
committed troops he has not yet exercised his half of the joint responsibility he shares with
Congress over the involvement of the country in hostilities, but if he initiates hostilities
without congressional concurrence or a declaration of war, the Congress has not yet exercised
its responsibility and may properly do so by concurrent resolution. Mr. Berger concurred. Id.
144. Objections to the use of concurrent resolutions are based on the contention that these
,resolutions do not conform to article I, section 7 of the Constitution. See generally Ginnane,
The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66
HARv. L. Rav. 569 (1953).
145. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 299 (1798).
146. E. CoRwIN, ToTA WAR AND rHE CONsTrmoN 45-47 (1970); E. CoRWmI, THE Pa-smanv
168-70, 234-35 (1948).
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thus appears to support use of concurrent resolutions to terminate
hostilities in circumstances other than invasion and protection of
troops during disengagement.
Another objection with constitutional overtones to the war powers
legislation as enacted concerns the authority of Congress under sec-
tion 5(b) to terminate hostilities at the end of 60 or 90 days simply
by taking no affirmative legislative action. '47 Few supporters of this
method of termination would argue against the desirability of af-
firmative action being taken to express legislative disapproval of the
President's intiative. The Whalen amendment, however, which
would have required affirmative action, stated that Congress should
respond "by a declaration of war or by the passage of a resolution
appropriate to the purpose .... "I's The House sponsors objected
that the word "appropriate" could be interpreted to require a joint
resolution which would be subject to veto by the President." Con-
gressman Zablocki stated that he would support the Whalen
amendment if it were altered to "provide that a resolution of ap-
proval be a concurrent resolution, and such a resolution was termed
appropriate . . . for disapproval." '
Congressional silence, moreover, appears an unlikely response to
the initiation of hostilities by the President. Particularly now that
war powers legislation exists, silence would be a politically unac-
ceptable alternative. Additionally, the likelihood of timely debate
and a vote is enhanced by the provisions of sections 6 and 7 of the
Resolution assuring priority consideration for any joint or concur-
rent resolution introduced pursuant to sections 5(b) and (c).
These political and procedural sources of pressure for a timely
vote are sufficient to cause concern among those who believe that
the Resolution broadens the President's war powers. Arguably, the
political pressures would be such that Congress never would take
action that could be interpreted as failing to support troops in the
field, and the procedural pressures of the Resolution would be such
that Congress would be unable to express disapproval by inaction.
Nevertheless, there never before has been a statutory procedure
requiring Congress to take a policy position immediately or requir-
ing the President to consult with and report to the Congress so fully.
147. See note 46 supra & accompanying text.
148. 119 CONG. REc. H6263 (daily ed. July 18, 1973) (emphasis supplied).
149. See note 47 supra & accompanying text.
150. 119 CONG. REc. H6267 (daily ed. July 18, 1973).
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These procedures, along with those assuring priority consideration
of resolutions introduced pursuant to sections 5(b) and (c), should
encourage consultation by the President with Congress before he
commits armed forces.
ThE PRACTICAL EFFECT AND OPERATION OF THE RESOLUTION
On July 21, 1974, after the outbreak of hostilities in Cyprus and
the subsequent invasion of the island by Turkey, the United States
ambassador requested .a military evacuation of American citizens.
A naval task force of five vessels was ordered to the scene, and 22
helicopter sorties to the British base at Dhekelia, Cyprus, were dis-
patched from the U.S.S. Inchon on July 22. Nearly 400 Americans
and approximately 80 foreign nationals were evacuated.,, The
following day, another 135 Americans and foreign nationals were
evacuated from Kyenia, Cyprus, by a joint American-British ef-
fort.' 2 No report of this action was made to Congress by President
Nixon pursuant to section 4 of the War Powers Resolution.
Shortly thereafter, Senator Eagleton stated to the Senate that
President Nixon had failed to pass the first major test of the law.153
The authority of the President to evacuate American nationals from
a hostile zone was not questioned, only that the circumstances,
authority, scope, and duration of the Cyprus operations had not
been reported. Along with copies of previous correspondence with
the State Department,' 4 Senator Eagleton included in the Congres-
sional Record a letter from him to Speaker of the House Carl Albert
and Senator James Eastland, President Pro Tempore of the Senate,
151. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1974, at 15, col. 4.
152. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1974, at 13, col. 8.
153. 120 CONG. REc. S13,851-53 (daily ed. July 31, 1974).
154. In addition to the correspondence from Assistant Secretary Wright, see note 113 supra,
Senator Eagleton received a second letter, from Assistant Secretary Linwood Holton, which
stated:
With respect to the 48-hour notification requirement, it is our view that no
particular new procedural measures within the Executive Branch are necessary.
The notification requirement is well known in all the relevant Government
agencies and there would appear to be no particular advantage either to the
effective application of the legislation or to the efficiency of the Executive
Branch in adopting procedures in addition to those regularly followed in re-
sponding to Congressional notification requirements. The particular nature and
content of any such notice would of course have to await an actual event covered
by the legislation, given the possible variety of actions covered.
120 CONG. Rac. S13,853 (daily ed. July 31, 1974).
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asking that the President be advised that he had failed to comply
with section 4 of the War Powers Resolution and calling for submis-
sion of the required report. '55
Strict construction of the language of section 4(a)(1) could indi-
cate that the circumstances of the Cyprus evacuation missions did
not involve introducing forces "into hostilities or situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated.""1 6 In retro-
spect, the swiftness, dispatch, and success of the helicopter sorties
would support a judgment that hostilities in fact were neither pres-
ent nor imminent. Moreover, it is questionable whether sending
helicopters on rescue missions to a British base in Cyprus consti-
tutes the dispatch of armed forces "into the territory, airspace or
waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat. . ." Never-
theless, the penetrating observation of Senator Eagleton should not
be ignored: "If this very popular introduction of the Armed Forces
goes unreported, can we assume that less popular, more dangerous
uses of force will be faithfully reported?" 157
No more than minimum compliance with the most narrow inter-
pretation of the President's responsibility could have been antici-
pated. Nixon Administration witnesses had attacked the war pow-
ers legislation concept as unconstitutional. ' President Nixon had
vetoed the bill as an improper restriction upon his constitutional
authority. Moreover, the response of the State Department to Sena-
tor Eagleton's queries hardly had pictured an Administration poised
and eager to respond to more than its own interpretation of the
letter of the law. '59
President Ford filed two reports under the Resolution in April
1975. The first, transmitted to Congress on April 4, reported United
155. This letter was addressed to Speaker Albert and Senator Eastland because section 4
requires submission of a written report to the Speaker and President Pro Tempore within 48
hours whenever the President introduces armed forces into hostilities in the absence of a
declaration of war. See Appendix 1.
156. There is no record of either the Speaker or the President Pro Tempore doing any more
than referring the letter to the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees. From the
lack of further action by Congress, it might be inferred that those to whom the letter was
referred concluded that the circumstances of the Cyprus invasion did not warrant submission
of a report. See 120 Cong. Rec. S13,852 (daily ed. July 31, 1974).
157. 120 CONG. REc. S13,852 (daily ed. July 31, 1974).
158. Hearings on S. 731, S.J. Res. 18, and S.J. Res. 59 Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (testimony of Secretary of State William
Rogers, May 14, 1971).
159. See note 154 supra.
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States participation in an international humanitarian relief effort to
transport South Vietnamese refugees from Da Nang, South Viet-
nam, utilizing American naval vessels and helicopters as well as
approximately 700 marines.6 0 The second report, transmitted on
April 12, informed Congress of an evacuation of 82 Americans, 159
Cambodians, and 35 nationals of other countries from Phnom Phen,
Cambodia; involved in the operation were 350 armed marines and
36 helicopters." ' In addition to the fact that these reports were the
first made to Congress pursuant to the Resolution, they were signifi-
cant because both were made under section 4(a)(2), which does not
trigger the 60-day period. If, as some evidence indicates inconclu-
sively, hostile action was encountered at Phnom Phen, 112 a report
under section 4(a) (1), which does trigger the subsequent portions of
the Resolution, would have been appropriate because of the immi-
nent possibility of involvement in hostilities. The evacuation having
been completed, however, further consideration by Congress would
have been moot.
One apparent factor in the submission of the two reports by the
Ford Administration was the Church-Case amendment to the Con-
tinuing Appropriations Resolution for 1974.13 Complementing six
other statutes which contained specific prohibitions, 4 the Church-
Case amendment was a general prohibition upon the expenditure of
appropriated funds for direct or indirect suport of combat activities
in, over, or from the shores of North or South Vietnam, Laos, or
Cambodia.
In a major foreign policy address to a joint session of Congress on
April 10, 1975, President Ford asked for clarification by Congress of
the use of military forces in Southeast Asia and for prompt revision
of the laws to permit evacuation of Vietnamese nationals. 65 This
160. See Appendix 2.
161. See Appendix 3.
162. News reports on April 12 were conflicting. In contrast to Associated Press reports that
the last helicopter out was fired upon, Thomas Lippman of the Washington Post reported
that no shots were fired. Washington Post, Apr. 12, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1. Radio broadcasts
reported that one Cambodian was killed and an American marine was wounded.
163. Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108 (July 1, 1973).
164. Dep't of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 93-437, § 839 (1974); Dep't of
Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 93-238, § 741 (1974); Foreign Assistance Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 30; Dep't of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
155, § 806 (1973); Dep't of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
126, § 13; Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307 (1973).
165. President Ford stated:
I ask the Congress to clarify immediately its restrictions on the use of U.S.
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latter request raises a question concerning the necessity of making
the request: if the evacuations of foreign nationals from Da Nang
and Phnom Phen were legal, then why was there a need for Congress
to permit specifically the projected evacuation of South Vietnamese
from Saigon? The President's request may have been due to the
probability of hostilities requiring a report under section 4(a)(1) of
the War Powers Resolution, as well as to an awareness that any
prolonged use of the military for such an evacuation without prior
congressional authorization would be a violation of the Church-Case
amendment. At the time of President Ford's foreign policy address,
no statute specifically authorized the introduction of armed forces
into South Vietnam within the meaning of section 8(a)(1) of the
War Powers Resolution; seven statutes, however, specifically pro-
hibited the use of funds for military purposes in South Vietnam."8
Thus it was necessary, as well as prudent, for the President to con-
sult with the Congress immediately.
Swift action resulted from the President's request. Both the Sen-
ate and the House passed legislation regarding humanitarian
assistance and evacuation, each house making reference to the War
Powers Resolution.187 On April 25, a conference committee report
reconciling the two bills as the Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance
and Evacuation Act of 1975 was presented to Congress along with a
statement by the conference chairman, Senator John Sparkman,
also the new Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
that the legislation provided an important precedent: it was the first
specific congressional authorization under the War Powers Resolu-
tion for the use of armed forces in hostilities. 8 The Senate agreed
military forces in Southeast Asia for the limited purposes of protecting Ameri-
can lives by ensuring their evacuation if this should be necessary, and I also ask
prompt revision of the law to cover those Vietnamese to whom we have a very
special obligation, and whose lives may be in danger, should the worst come to
pass.
121 CoNG. REc. H2684 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1973).
166. See notes 163, 164 supra.
167. 121 CONG. REc. S6852 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1975).
168. Id. at S6872. The conference report accompanied the Vietnam Humanitarian Assis-
tance and Evacuation Act of 1975, H.R. 6096, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Included in the
Act were the following provisions: (1) an authorization of $327 million for humanitarian
assistance and evacuation with the requirement that within 90 days and every 90 days there-
after, a report on humanitarian assistance under the Act be filed with the Speaker and Senate
Foreign Relations Committee; (2) an authorization for the President to use armed forces to
assist in withdrawing Americans, their dependents and endangered foreign nationals in a
single operation, if feasible; (3) that, if armed forces are employed, a report would be filed
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to the conference report 69 and transmitted it to the House where the
Rules Committee, on April 28, cleared the conference bill for action
on the floor of the House on the following day.
On April 29, however, news began arriving of the final evacuation
from Saigon by helicopter of all remaining Americans and some
South Vietnamese, the entire operation being almost completed by
the time the House convened. Shortly after the conference report
was called up for consideration, Speaker Carl Albert called from the
White House to ask that the resolution for the bill be withdrawn.
Later that day, after the resolution had been withdrawn pursuant
to his message,70 Speaker Albert reported an agreement with the
President that consideration would be deferred because disagree-
ment concerning the bill's authorization for the President to use
troops in Vietnam might be moot before the day was over.' 7' Repre-
sentative Bella Abzug agreed that the authorization was moot and
any enactment of it at that time might authorize reintroduction of
troops into Vietnam. 72 Representative Zablocki, however, urged
consideration of the bill because its adoption would require de-
tailed reports of the evacuation by the President and the force-
authorization portions of the bill could provide a precedent for con-
gressional action under the War Powers Resolution.7 Representa-
tive Thomas Morgan, Chairman of the House Committee on Inter-
national Relations, later issued a statement supporting considera-
tion of the conference report.74 Meanwhile, on April 30, President
Ford submitted a report to Congress about the evacuation of Saigon,
acknowledging that the report was submitted pursuant to section 4
under section 4 of the War Powers Resolution; (4) that, if the armed forces are used to bring
out endangered foreign nationals, a report would be filed under section 4(b) of the WarPowers
Resolution; (5) that the Act is stated to be specific statutory authority under section 8(a) of
the War Powers Resolution, but not for the purposes of sections 5(b) and (c) of the War
Powers Resolution; (6) that statutory prohibitions against use of funds for combat activities
in Vietnam are waived; (7) that daily reports on the withdrawal be filed with Congress; (8)
that the President use diplomatic means to obtain an accounting of Americans missing in
action and the remains of known American dead, and report on the actions being taken within
30 days after aid is made available; (9) that no funds under the Act be used, directly or
indirectly, by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment. See S. EP. No. 94-97, 94th Cong., 1st Ses. (1975).
169. 121 CONG. RIc. S6878 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1975).
170. 121 CONG. Rlc. 143401 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1975).
171. Id. at H3406.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Statement of Representative Morgan, Apr. 29, 1975.
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of the War Powers Resolution, but not specifying which subsection
of section 4 required the report.7 5
Following the unconditional surrender of the South Vietnamese
government, assorted opponents of the conference committee's bill
combined on May 1 to reject the committee's report and bill.176
Liberals opposed the conference report because they feared it would
authorize reintervention in Vietnam;'7 7 conservatives opposed it
because they feared a large influx of refugees into the United States
and the possibility that humanitarian aid funds authorized by the
bill would end up in the hands of the Provisional Revolutionary
Government. 7 8 A variety of Congressmen could have voted against
the report on the basis that much of the controversy over its provi-
sions was moot.
According to testimony given before the House Committee on
International Relations on May 7 after the various Vietnam opera-
tions, the present view of the Department of State is that the re-
quirement for prior consultation contained in section 3 of the War
Powers Resolution does not apply to all of the situations in which
an after-the-fact report is required by section 4(a), with the result
that the President is not required to enter into prior consultations
with Congress except when armed forces are to be introduced into
present or clearly imminent hostilities.' The Department's witness
175. See Appendix 4.
176. 121 CONG. REC. H3540-51 (daily ed. May 1, 1975).
In a later commentary on the House decision, Senator Eagleton wrote the following:
But Congress fumbled the ball. When the President was forced by events to
order the evacuation from South Vietnam on April 20, the House of Representa-
tives had not yet completed the final stage in enacting the necessary legislation.
Two days later, when the House finally had the opportunity to express Congres-
sional will and intent, the House voted overwhelmingly not to act.
This unfortunate decision raises grave questions about the willingness of Con-
gress to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. The President obviously had no
authority to use the United States forces to rescue foreign nationals in Vietnam.
Yet our forces evacuated thousands of Vietnamese. Asked to explain, President
Ford tried to justify his action on 'moral' rather than legal grounds. Yet Congress
let the precedent stand. Future Presidents might now conclude that the Com-
mander in Chief had an inherent right to do what Mr. Ford did.
Eagleton, Congress's "Inaction" On War, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1975, at 39, col 2.
177. For example, Majority Leader Thomas O'Neill stated that the provision authorizing
use of troops in South Vietnam had become moot and that to pass the bill would set "a bad
precedent for the future." 33 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 907 (May 3, 1975).
178. For example, Congressman Bauman stated that he would oppose sending any money
into Communist-controlled areas. Id.
179. See Statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to the
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stated that although the President in fact directed some prior con-
sultation for each of the three emergencies about which he subse-
quently reported to Congress, prior consultations technically were
not required by the Resolution."'0 Acceptance of this construction,
which is supportable by a reading of the Resolution, would thwart
one of the Resolution's principal purposes, prior consultation with
Congress on use-of-force decisions generally.
Prior to the series of reports filed by the Ford Administration
beginning in April 1975, the most serious threat to the War Powers
Resolution was that it would be ignored. This disregard, exemplified
by the Cyprus operations, appeared to be a greater challenge to the
Resolution than the various constitutional objections. The latter
might be debated periodically in the classroom and Congress, but
they seemed unlikely to be resolved by judicial opinion. Realists
would agree with Senator Javits' observation in his final argument
after the override of President Nixon's veto:
I doubt very much that any court would have decided [the
constitutionality of the Resolution] before or would decide it
now. It is almost a classic example of what the courts have
considered a "political question." That was the reason we had
to settle it through legislation, including a veto override. No one
is being arrogant about this. We are talking about war. This
involves human lives in the millions. 8'
Because the viability of the Resolution will continue to depend
upon the response of the President to future circumstances and
events, a promising sign for the Resolution was the handling of the
seizure on May 12, 1975, of an American ship, the Mayaguez, off the
coast of Cambodia by forces of that nation's new regime. President
Ford promptly consulted 182 with Congress, and on May 14 the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee issued the following statement:
"We support the President in the exercise of his Constitutional pow-
ers within the framework of the War Powers Resolution to secure the
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations, May 7, 1975.
180. Congressman Zablock! does not share this view, believing that prior consultation had
not taken place before either the Da Nang or Phnom Phen evacuations. Private communica-
tion to author.
181. 119 CONG. RoE. S20,116 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973).
182. All did not agree that consultation took place. Senator Henry Jackson stated that
President Ford had not consulted with Congress, but had advised them. Virginian Pilot, May
19, 1975, § A, at 2.
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release of the ship and its men."'' 3 On the next day President Ford
reported to Congress"' "[i]n accordance with my desire that the
Congress be informed on this matter and taking note of Section
4(a) (1) of the War Powers Resolution ... "I"
These actions concerning the rescue of the Mayaguez do not es-
tablish conclusively the efficacy of the Resolution. Along with the
reports filed after the evacuations in Southeast Asia and the provi-
sions of the unenacted Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and
Evacuation Act of 1975,'11 they evidence the Resolution's utility,
inducing consultation about and shared responsibility for commit-
ment of the armed forces. 87 Nevertheless, Presidents thus far have
given only restrained compliance, and experience during 1975 has
confirmed that emergency situations may require swift action by the
President when war powers considerations are overtaken and ren-
dered moot by the press of events. It now would be appropriate for
Congress to review the Resolution, particularly the consultation and
reporting sections, with a view toward the recent history of the four
reports submitted concerning the evacuations at Da Nang, Phnom
Phen, and Saigon, and the Mayaguez incident. Improved proce-
dures both within Congress and the executive branch for implemen-
tation of the Resolution are needed. 188
183. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1975, at 18, col. 7.
184. See Appendix 5.
185. Id. This language probably satisfied those in Congress, particularly the Members of
the House Committee on International Relations who had questioned Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser, Department of State, asking why the report on the Saigon evacuation had not
specifically been made under section 4(a)(1). Hearings before the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations, May 7, 1975.
186. See note 168 supra & accompanying text.
187. However, Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, stated that some Members of his committee felt the consultation was not adequate.
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield voiced concern that Congressional leaders were merely
notified of decisions already reached by President Ford rather than consulted while options
were still open. Washington Star, May 16, 1975, § A, at 5.
188. The initial comments of some of the principals in the history of war powers legislation
show that familiar problems and themes remain. Two of the orginal architects, Senators
Javits and Eagleton, advocate changes in section 2(c) and in the consultation and reporting
process to empower the President to evacuate and rescue American nationals in emergency
situations prior to congressional concurrence. Within days after the Mayaguez incident, Sena-
tor Eagleton addressed the Senate:
[The reason Congress did not clarify the assignment of war powers], accord-
ing to a brief prepared by House conferees considering war powers legislation
was that the "necessary and proper" clause did not give "Congress the right to
define the powers of the President." I believe that the acceptance of such a
statement is equivalent to a declaration of congressional impotence.
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Nonetheless, my concern over the war powers resolution was grounded on
practical as well as constitutional considerations. The procedure established by
the resolution did not involve Congress in the decisionmalding process until after
forces were committed to battle. I was concerned that such a procedure would
tie Congress hands and contribute to rather than inhibit the derogation of war-
making responsibilities that had characterized the congressionalperformance in
recent years.
It is not my purpose today to rehash the debate on this issue or to assert that
recent experience has proven my case. I am here because I sense a very positive
desire on the part of those who supported the war powers resolution to involve
Congress in the decisionmaking process atthe outset, even before the provisions
of the statute come into play. I am encouraged, for example, that such leading
advocates of the war powers resolution as Senator Javits, and Representatives
Zablocki, Morgan, and Fraser, fought to inject the concept of congressional
authorization into the Vietnam evacuation. Congress eventual failure to act on
this matter cannot, therefore, be ascribed to any of those who worked so long
and hard on the war powers resolution.
The amendments I offer today do not go to my central criticism of that
resolution. I recognize that reversing the House on such a fundamental matter
as the issue of prior authority would be next to impossible. And I will add, on
the positive side, that as long as there is a growing awareness of Congress
constitutional responsibility to initiate war and a growing resolve to invoke that
power, there is, concomitantly, a diminishing requirement for a statutory ap-
proach to the problem.
121 CONG. Rac. 88825 (daily ed. May 21, 1975). The amendments referred to would accom-
plish the following: recognize in section 2(c) the "traditionally exercised" right of the Presi-
dent to rescue American nationals under certain prescribed circumstances; substitute "seek
the advice and counsel of Congress" for "consult with Congress" in section 3 (cf. note 41
supra); and circumscribe the President's use of civilian combatants in the same manner as
the use of uniformed armed forces. Id. at S8825-26. The last of these provisions is a revival
of Senator Eagleton's "CIA amendment." See notes 56-58 supra & accompanying text.
Senator Javits also has seen a need for review of procedures under the Resolution, stating
in early June 1975:
Within the past eight weeks, the War Powers Resolution. . . has been tested
under fire three times in rapid succession. I believe that this unique legislation
has stood-up well in its initial tests; and that this is an opportune time to
examine with some care just what the initial tests reveal about the War Powers
Resolution.
First, I think it is important to note that [the War Powers Resolution] has
been accepted by the Executive Branch as the central legislation defining the
legal parameters of Presidential initiative in the introduction of the Armed
Forces into hostilities, as well as the correlation of such actions with the powers
and responsibilities of the Congress. President Ford's compliance with the law
is in welcome contrast to his predecessor's unsuccessful effort to veto it.
Second, our initial experiences show that improved procedures are required,
both within the Executive Branch and the Congress, to assure smooth and
effective implementation of this legislation.
Third, it seems clear that while the Executive Branch has accepted the re-
quirement of compliance with the War Powers Resolution, the Congress must
be vigilant, alert and active to assure that the spirit as well as the letter of the
law is observed. If Congress sits back passively end merely awaits Executive
fulfillment of the reporting requirements of the law, the key policy decisions will
continue to be monopolized by the Executive Branch, as they were in the
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Assessment of the early tests of the Resolution is complicated by
the presence of several other factors. It may be impossible to deter-
mine with certainty whether President Ford would have turned to
Congress for the evacuation operations if other legislation had not
decades leading up to enactment of the War Powers Resolution.
Fourth, the initial test runs have shown that the consultation provisions of
the law is the pressure point most vulnerable to circumvention and manipula-
tion.
Testimony of Senator Javits Before the International Security and Scientific Affairs Sub-
comm. of the House International Relations Comm., June 4, 1975.
Senator Goldwater has remained firm in his opposition to the Resolution, stating to the
Senate:
There is another question raised by these laws that did not occur during the
evacuations, but very well could have. The answer to this question may be
crucial to the safety of the United States and its citizens at some time in the
future. This question is raised by the belief of the sponsors of the war powers
resolution that Congress can put a halt to an emergency rescue operation at any
time even though it involves the protection of U.S. Citizens.
For example, on April 23, 1 engaged in a colloquy over the pending evacuation
authority with the senior Senator from New York (Mr. Javits). While admitting
that the President "has an unchallenged right, under the Constitution, to use
the Armed Forces of the United States to rescue Americans from a war zone,"
the Senator from New York declared that-
Those forces, when so used, remain accountable to the Country through both
he and the Congress, so that we may have some control over what happens with
respect to their use, and so that the whole thing may be called off if it goes
beyond what we think is a fair measure of use for their purpose. (Emphasis
added.)
If what my friend from New York says is true, then it means that Congress
can tell the President 1 day, or 1 hour, after he initiates a humanitarian rescue
mission to protect American citizens that he must call the whole thing off. If
Congress fears the operation could involve some risk which outweighs the safety
of the number of Americans immediately involved, it can direct the President
to abandon those Americans.
This contingency, which I truly hope will never happen, could occur under
section 5(c) of the war powers resolution which provides that American forces
engaged in hostilities outside the United States without a declaration of war or
specific statutory authorization "shall be removed by the President if the Con-
gress so directs by concurrent resolution."
Mr. President, congressional measures of this type could cripple not only the
President, but through him, the United States at some time of great need for
immediate and decisive action. The very fact that one might argue that the
President now stands in violation of the law points up the dangerous position
in which we have placed our country, our citizens, and our President.
Mr. President, I intend to continue discussing the war powers resolution and
similar laws from time to time in the continuing hope that we might get it before
the American people for consideration of a proper solution through a constitu-
tional amendment.
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prohibited specifically the use of funds for combat activities by
United States forces in South Vietnam. Likewise, it is difficult to
gauge the effect of the fear of an influx of refugees upon the defeat
of Congress' first attempt to authorize action by the President under
the War Powers Resolution; the inclusion of humanitarian-aid pro-
visions in that legislation also complicates assessment.
It is clear that the hoped-for balancing of legislative and executive
war powers will depend upon prompt consultation and full reporting
by the President and upon the efforts made by Congress to obtain
compliance. These conditions will be met if Presidents and the Con-
gress remember the overriding message of the war powers proposals
that the constitutional powers of war and peace are shared powers
and that the responsibility to the people for war or peace is a shared
responsibility. If these postulates of the War Powers Resolution are
observed, then the provisions of the Resolution for prior consulta-
tion and timely reports are adequate to allow and encourage Con-
gress to adopt an early, considered policy position concerning the
wisdom and necessity of troop commitments initiated by the Presi-
dent.
CONCLUSION
As an attempt to bring about shared responsibility for decisions
of war and peace and to enable the President and Congress each to
fulfill their constitutional responsibilities, the War Powers Resolu-
tion contains much language that can be interpreted as not manda-
tory. A product of compromise, reflecting in part the debris of a
legislative battlefield, it depends for its efficacy upon the good faith
and judgment of Presidents and the will of Congress. The ambigui-
ties arising from the Resolution's legislative history, wording, and
constitutional premises are resolvable in the context of accommoda-
tion, particularly where the public debate over issues as crucial as
war powers encourages accommodation. Whether the reliance upon
such accommodation will destroy the efficacy of the War Powers
Resolution cannot yet be determined. The limited use of its proce-
dures thus far, and the results of that use, must be characterized
as inconclusive. The test of experience ultimately will determine
whether the enactment of the Resolution constituted congressional
surrender or an historic accomplishment.
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APPENDIX 1
The War Powers Resolution, Enacted November 7, 1973
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Pow-
ers Resolution".
PURPOSE AND POLICY
SEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the
intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and
insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the
President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to
the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifi-
cally provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all
laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its
own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any department or offi-
cer thereof.
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-
in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant
to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States,
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
CONSULTATION
SEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult
with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such
introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United
States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have
been removed from such situations.
REPORTING
SEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case
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in which United States Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstan-
ces;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation,
while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate
solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces;
or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States
Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign
nation;
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the
Senate a report, in writing, setting forth-
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of
United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which
such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the
Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional respon-
sibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the
use of United States Armed Forces abroad.
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into
hostilities or into any situation describea in subsection (a) of this
section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue
to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress
periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as
on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no
event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six
months.
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
SEC. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1)
shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar
day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Corn-
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mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If,
when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die
or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tern-
pore of the Senate; if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at
least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall
jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it
may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to
this section.
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is
required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is
earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States
Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or
required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war
or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States
Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3)
is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the
United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more
than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certi-
fies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity
respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the
continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about
a prompt removal of such forces.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United
States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory
of the United States, its possessions and territories without a decla-
ration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be
removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent
resolution.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL
SEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to
section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the
sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be,
and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill,
together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four cal-
endar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in
such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the
yeas and nays.
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(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the
pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate
the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents
and the opponents), and shall be voted on within threb calendar
days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by
yeas and nays.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be
referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection
(a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days
before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section
5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pend-
ing business of the House in question and shall be voted on within
three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House
shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of
Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both
Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee
of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such reso-
lution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration
of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the
conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back
to their respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any
rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports
in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such
reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than
the expiration of such sixty-day period.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to
section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent
resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its
recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House
shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the
pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate
the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents
and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days
thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and
nays.
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(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be
referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection
(a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its
recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon
become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon
within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise deter-
mine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of
Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both
Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee
of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such con-
current resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is
referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule
in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the
Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports,
such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six
calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the
conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back
to their respective Houses in disagreement.
INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION
SEC. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before
the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any
provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provi-
sion specifically authorizes the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states
that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of this joint resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless
such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authoriz-
ing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties or into such situations and stating that it is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning
of this joint resolution.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require
any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of
United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of
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the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquar-
ters operations of high-level military commands which were estab-
lished prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and
pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the
United States prior to such date.
(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction
of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of mem-
bers of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in
the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military
forces of any foreign country or government when such military
forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such
forces will become engaged, in hostilities.
(d) Nothing in this joint resolution-
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the
Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties;
or
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the Presi-
dent with respect to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which au-
thority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolu-
tion.
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
SEC. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder
of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any
other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its
enactment.
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APPENDIX 2
Report Dated April 4, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford to
Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in
Compliance with Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution
April 4, 1975.
Hon. Carl Albert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Peking, China
(C/O Ambassador Bush).
As you know, last Saturday I directed United States participation
in an international humanitarian relief effort to transport refugees
from Danang and other seaports to safer areas farther south in Viet-
nam. The United States has been joined in this humanitarian effort
by a number of other countries who are offering people, supplies and
vessels to assist in this effort. This effort was undertaken in response
to urgent appeals from the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
because of the extremely grave nature of the circumstances involv-
ing the lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees. This situation has
been brought about by large-scale violations of the Agreement End-
ing the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam by the North
Vietnamese who have been conducting massive attacks on the
northern and central provinces of South Vietnam.
In accordance with my desire to keep the Congress fully informed
on this matter, and taking note of the provision of section 4(a)(2)
of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), I wish to report
to you concerning one aspect of United States participation in the
refugee evacuation effort. Because of the large number of refugees
and the overwhelming dimensions of the task, I have ordered U.S.
Naval vessels to assist in this effort, including Amphibious Task
Group 76.8 with 12 embarked helicopters and approximately 700
Marines. These naval vessels have been authorized to approach the
coast of South Vietnam to pick up refugees and U.S. nationals, and
transport them to safety. Marines are being detailed to vessels par-
ticipating in the rescue mission. The first vessel entered South Viet-
nam territorial waters at 0400 a.m. EDT on April 3, 1975.
Although these forces are equipped for combat within the mean-
ing of section 4(a)(2) of Public Law 93-148, their sole mission is to
assist in the evacuation including the maintenance of order on board
the vessels engaged in that task.
[Vol. 16:823
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
As stated above, the purpose of the introduction of United States
Naval vessels into Vietnamese waters is to assist in an international
humanitarian effort involving vessels of several nations, including
both military and civilian craft. The United States participation in
this effort includes the charter of commercial vessels, the use of
Military Sealift Command vessels with civilian crews, as well as
United States naval vessels with military crews. This effort is being
undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority as
Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive in the conduct of foreign
relations and pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, which authorizes humanitarian assistance to refugees,
civilian war casualties and other person§ disadvantaged by hostili-
ties or conditions relating to hostilities in South Vietnam.
You will appreciate, I am sure, my difficulty in telling you pre-
cisely how long United States forces may be needed in this effort.
Our present estimate, however, is that this operation may involve
the presence of United States Naval vessels in Vietnamese waters
for a period of at least several weeks.
GERALD R. FORD.
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APPENDIX 3
Report Dated April 12, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford to
Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in
Compliance with Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution
THE WHrrE HousE
Washington, D.C., April 12, 1975.Hon. Carl Albert,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: As you and other members of Congress were
advised, in view of circumstances in Cambodia, the United States
had certain contingency plans to utilize United States Armed
Forces to assure the safe evacuation of U.S. Nationals from that
country. On Friday, 11 April 1975, the Khmer Communists forces
had ruptured Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) defense
lines to the north, northwest and east of Phnom Penh and were
within mortar range of Pochentong Airfield and the outskirts of
Phnom Penh. In view of this deteriorating military situation, and
on the recommendations of the American Ambassador there, I or-
dered U.S. military forces to proceed with the planned evacuation
out of consideration for the safety of U.S. citizens.
In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed
on this matter, and taking note of Section 4 of the War Powers
Resolution (P.L. 93-148), I wish to report to you that the first ele-
ments of the U.S. forces entered Cambodian airspace at 8:34 P.M.
EDT on 11 April. Military forces included 350 ground combat troops
of the U.S. Marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting tactical air and
command and control elements. The Marines were deployed from
helicopters to assure the security of [a] helicopter landing zone
within the city of Phnom Penh. The first helicopter landed at ap-
proximately 10:00 P.M. EDT 11 April 1975, and the last evacuees
and ground security force Marines departed the Cambodian land-
ing zone at approximately 12:20 A.M. on 12 April 1975. The last
elements of the force to leave received hostile recoilless rifle fire.
There was no firing by U.S. forces at any time during the operation.
No U.S. Armed Forces personnel were killed, wounded or missing,
and there were no casualties among the American evacuees.
Although these forces were equipped for combat within the mean-
ing of Section 4(a)(2) of Public Law 93-148, their mission was to
effect the evacuation of U.S. Nationals. Present information indi-
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cates that a total of 82 U.S. citizens were evacuated and that the
task force was also able to accommodate 35 third country nationals
and 159 Cambodians including employees of the U.S. Government.
The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the
President's Constitutional executive power and authority as
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Armed Forces.
I am sure you share with me my pride in the Armed Forces of the
United States and my thankfulness that the operation was
conducted without incident.
Sincerely,
GERALD R. FORD
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APPENDIX 4
Report Dated April 30, 1975 from President Gerald R. Ford to
Hon. James 0. Eastland, President Pro Tempore of the Senate
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D.C., April 30, 1975
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
On April 4, 1975, I reported that U.S. naval vessels had been
ordered to participate in an international humanitarian relief effort
to transport refugees and U.S. nationals to safety from Danang and
other seaports in South Vietnam. This effort was undertaken in
response to urgent appeals from the Government of South Vietnam
and in recognition of the large-scale violations by the North Viet-
namese of the Agreement Ending the War and Restoring the Peace
in Vietnam.
In the days and weeks that followed, the massive North Vietnam-
ese attacks continued. As the forces of the Government of South
Vietnam were pushed further back toward Saigon, we began a pro-
gressive withdrawal of U.S. citizens and their dependents in South
Vietnam, together with foreign nationals whose lives were in jeop-
ardy.
On April 28, the defensive lines to the northwest and south of
Saigon were breached. Tan Son Nhut Airfield and Saigon came
under increased rocket attack and for the first time received artil-
lery fire. NVA forces were approaching within mortar and anti-
aircraft missile range. The situation at Tan Son Nhut Airfield dete-
riorated to the extent that it became unusable. Crowd control on the
airfield was breaking down and the collapse of the Government
forces within Saigon appeared imminent. The situation presented
a direct and imminent threat to the remaining U.S. citizens and
their dependents in and around Saigon.
On the recommendation of the American Ambassador there, I
ordered U.S. military forces to proceed by means of rotary wing
aircraft with an emergency final evacuation out of consideration for
the safety of U.S. citizens.
In accordance with my desire to keep the Congress fully informed
on this matter, and taking note of the provision of section 4 of the
War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), I wish to report to you
that at about 1:00 A.M. EDT, April 29, 1975, U.S. forces entered
South Vietnam airspace.
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A force of 70 evacuation helicopters and 865 Marines evacuated
about 1400 U.S. citizens, together with approximately 5500 third
country nationals and South Vietnamese, from landing zones in the
vicinity of the U.S. Embassy, Saigon, and the Defense Attache Of-
fice at Tan Son Nhut Airfield. The last elements of the ground
security force departed Saigon at 7:46 P.M. EDT April 29, 1975.
Two crew members of a Navy search and rescue helicopter are miss-
ing at sea. There are no other known U.S. casualties from this opera-
tion, although two U.S. Marines on regular duty in the compound
of the Defense Attache Office at Tan Son Nhut Airfield had been
killed on the afternoon (EDT) of April 28, 1975, by rocket attacks
into a refugee staging area. U.S. fighter aircraft provided protective
air cover for this operation, and for the withdrawal by water of a few
Americans from Can Tho, and in one instance suppressed North
Vietnamese anti-aircraft artillery firing upon evacuation helicopters
as they departed. The ground security forces on occasion returned
fire during the course of the evacuation operation.
The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the Presi-
dent's Constitutional executive power and his authority as
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Armed Forces.
The United States Armed Forces performed a very difficult mis-
sion most successfully. Their exemplary courage and discipline are
deserving of the nation's highest gratitude.
GERALD R. FORD
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APPENDIX 5
Report Dated May 15, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford to
Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives
THE WHITE HousE
Washington, D.C., May 15, 1975
DEAR MR. SPEAKER:
On 12 May 1975, 1 was advised that the SS Mayaguez, a merchant
vessel of U.S. registry enroute from Hong Kong to Thailand with a
U.S. citizen crew, was fired upon, stopped, boarded, and seized by
Cambodian naval patrol boats of the Armed Forces of Cambodia in
international waters in the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island. The seized
vessel was then forced to proceed to Koh Tang Island where it was
required to anchor. This hostile act was in clear violation of interna-
tional law.
In view of this illegal and dangerous act, I ordered, as you have
been previously advised, United States military forces to conduct
the necessary reconnaissance and to be ready to respond if diplo-
matic efforts to secure the return of the vessel and its personnel were
not successful. Two United States reconnaissance. aircraft in the
course of locating the Mayaguez sustained minimal damage from
small firearms. Appropriate demands for the return of the
Mayaguez and its crew were made, both publicly and privately,
without success.
In accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on
this matter and taking note of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers
Resolution, I wish to report to you that at about 6:20 a.m., 13 May,
pursuant to my instructions to prevent the movement of the
Mayaguez into a mainland port, U.S. aircraft fired warning shots
across the bow of the ship and gave visual signals to small craft
approaching the ship. Subsequently, in order to stabilize the situa-
tion and in an attempt to preclude removal of the American crew
of the Mayaguez to the mainland, where their rescue would be more
difficult, I directed the United States Armed Forces to isolate the
island and interdict any movement between the ship or the island
and the mainland, and to prevent movement of the ship itself, while
still taking all possible care to prevent loss of life or injury to the
U.S. captives. During the evening of 13 May, a Cambodian patrol
boat attempting to leave the island disregarded aircraft warnings
and was sunk. Thereafter, two other Cambodian patrol craft were
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destroyed and four others were damaged and immobilized. One
boat, suspected of having some U.S. captives aboard, succeeded in
reaching Kompong Som after efforts to turn it around without in-
jury to the passengers failed.
Our continued objective in this operation was the rescue of the
captured American crew along with the retaking of the ship
Mayaguez. For that purpose, I ordered late this afternoon an assault
by United States Marines on the island of Koh Tang to search out
and rescue such Americans as might still be held there, and I or-
dered retaking of the Mayaguez by other marines boarding from the
destroyer escort Holt. In addition to continued fighter and gunship
coverage of the Koh Tang area, these marine activities were sup-
ported by tactical aircraft from the Coral Sea, striking the military
airfield at Ream and other military targets in the area of Kompong
Som in order to prevent reinforcement or support from the mainland
of the Cambodian forces detaining the American vessel and crew.
At approximately 9:00 p.m. e.d.t. on 14 May, the Mayaguez was
retaken by United States forces. At approximately 11:30 p.m., the
entire crew of the Mayaguez was taken aboard the Wilson. U.S.
forces have begun the process of disengagement and withdrawal.
This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the Presi-
dent's constitutional Executive power and his authority as
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.
GERALD R. FORD
19751 873
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX 6
House Joint Resolution 542, As Passed By House, July 18, 1973,
And Referred To Senate
Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This measure may be cited as the "War Powers Reso-
lution of 1973".
CONSULTATION
SEC. 2. The President in every possible instance shall consult
with the leadership and appropriate committees of the Congress
before committing United States Armed Forces to hostilities or to
situations where hostilities may be imminent, and after every such
commitment shall consult regularly with such Members and com-
mittees until such United States Armed Forces are no longer en-
gaged- in hostilities or have been removed from areas where hostili-
ties may be imminent.
REPORTING
SEC. 3. In any case in which the President without a declaration
of war by the Congress-
(1) commits United States Armed Forces to hostilities out-
side the territory of the United States, its possessions and terri-
tories;
(2) commits United States Armed Forces equipped for com-
bat to the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, ex-
cept for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement,
repair, or training of United States Armed Forces; or
(3) substantially enlarges United States Armed Forces
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;
the President shall submit within seventy-two hours to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore
of the Senate a report, in witing, setting forth-
(A) the circumstances necessitating his action;
(B) the constitutional and legislative provisions under the
authority of which he took such action;
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(C) the estimated scope of activities; and
(D) such other information as the President may deem use-
ful to the Congress in the fulfillment of its constitutional respon-
sibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to
the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
SEC. 4. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 3 shall
be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same day. If
Congress is not in session when the report is transmitted, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tern-
pore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable, shall jointly request
the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the
report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section. Each
report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee for appropriate action, and each such report
shall be printed as a document for each House.
(b) Within one hundred and twenty calendar days after a report
is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 3,
the President shall terminate any commitment and remove any
enlargement of United States Armed Forces with respect to which
such report was submitted, unless the Congress enacts a declaration
of war or a specific authorization for the use of United States Armed
Forces.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that the United
States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory
of the United States, its possessions and territories without a decla-
ration of war or other specific authorization of the Congress, such
forces shall be disengaged by the President if the Congress so directs
by concurrent resolution.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURE
SEc. 5. (a) Any resolution or bill introduced pursuant to sec-
tion 4(b) at least forty-five days before the expiration of the one
hundred and twenty-day period specified in said section shall be
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Repre-
sentatives or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and one such
resolution or bill shall be reported out by such committee, together
with its recommendations, not later than thirty days before the
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expiration of the one hundred and twenty-day period specified in
said section.
(b) Any resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending
business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three
legislative days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise deter-
mine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a resolution or bill passed by one House shall be re-
ferred to the appropriate committee of the other House and shall be
reported out not later than fifteen days before the expiration of the
one hundred and twenty-day period specified in said section. The
resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of
the House in question and shall be voted on within three legislative
days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise
determine by yeas and nays.
SEc. 6. (a) Any resolution introduced pursuant to section 4(c)
shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as
the case may be, and one such resolution shall be reported out by
such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen
calendar days.
(b) Any resolution so reported shall become the pending busi-
ness of the House in question and shall be voted on within three
legislative days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise deter-
mine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a resolution passed by one House shall be referred to
the appropriate committee of the other House and shall be reported
out by such committee together with its recommendations within
fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending busi-
ness of such House and shall be voted upon within three legislative
days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and
nays.
TERMINATION OF CONGRESS
SEC. 7. For the purposes of subsection (b) of section 4, in the
event of the termination of a Congress before the expiration of the
one hundred and twenty-day period specified in such subsection (b),
without action having been taken by the Congress under such
subsection, such one hundred and twenty-day period shall not ex-
pire sooner than forty-eight days after the convening of the next
succeeding Congress, provided that a resolution or bill is intro-
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duced, pursuant to such subsection (b), within three days of the
convening of such next succeeding Congress.
INTERPRETATION OF ACT
SEC. 8. Nothing in this Act (a) is intended to alter the constitu-
tional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions
of existing treaties;
(b) Shall be construed to represent congressional acceptance of
the proposition that Executive action alone can satisfy the constitu-
tional process requirement contained in the provisions of mutual
security treaties to which the United States is a party; or
(c) Shall be construed as granting any authority to the President
with respect to the commitment of United States Armed Forces to
hostilities or to the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation
which he would not have had in the absence of this Act.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 9. This Act shall take effect on the date of its enactment.
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APPENDIX 7
Senate Bill 440, As Passed By Senate, July 20, 1973, And
Referred To House
AN ACT
To make rules governing the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States in the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "War Powers Act".
PURPOSE AND POLICY
SEC. 2. It is the purpose of this Act to fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of the Armed Forces of the United States
in hostilities, or in situations where imminent involvement in hostil-
ities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued
use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations after they have
been introduced in hostilities or in such situations. Under article I,
section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the
Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper
for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other
powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof. At the same time,
this Act is not intended to encroach upon the recognized powers of
the President, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, to con-
duct hostilities authorized by the Congress, to respond to attacks or
the imminent threat of attacks upon the United States, including
its territories and possessions, to repel attacks or forestall the immi-
nent threat of attacks against the Armed Forces of the United
States, and, under proper circumstances, to rescue endangered citi-
zens and nationals of the United States located in foreign countries.
EMERGENCY USE OF THE ARMED FORCES
SEC. 3. In the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress,
the Aimed Forces of the United States may be introduced in hostili-
ties, or in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, only-
[Vol. 16:823
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
(1) to repel an armed attack upon the United States, its
territories and possessions; to take necessary and appropriate
retaliatory actions in the event of such an attack; and to fore-
stall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack;
(2) to repel an armed attack against the Armed Forces of the
United State located outside of the United States, its territories
and possessions, and to forestall the direct and imminent threat
of such an attack;
(3) to protect while evacuating citizens and nationals of the
United States, as rapidly as possible, from (A) any situation on
the high seas involving a direct and imminent threat to the lives
of such citizens and nationals, or (B) any country in which such
citizens and nationals are present with the express or tacit con-
sent of the government of such country and are being subjected
to a direct and imminent threat to their lives, either sponsored
by such government or beyond the power of such government to
control; but the President shall make every effort to terminate
such a threat without using the Armed Forces of the United
States, and shall, where possible, obtain the consent of the gov-
ernment of such country before using the Armed Forces of the
United States to protect citizens and nationals of the United
States being evacuated from such country; or
(4) pursuant to specific statutory authorization, but author-
ity to introduce the Armed Forces of the United States in hostili-
ties or in any such situation shall not be inferred (A) from any
provision of law hereafter enacted, including any provision con-
tained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifi-
cally authorizes the introduction of such Armed Forces in hostil-
ities or in such situation and specifically exempts the introduc-
tion of such Armed Forces from compliance with the provisions
of this Act, or (B) from any treaty hereafter ratified unless such
treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the
introduction of the Armed Forces of the United States in hostili-
ties or in such situation and specifically exempting the introduc-
tion of such Armed Forces from compliance with the provisions
of this Act. For purposes of this clause (4), "introduction of the
Armed Forces of the United States" includes the assignment of
- members of the Armed Forces of the United States to command,
coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the
regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or
government when such military forces are engaged, or there ex-
ists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged,
in hostilities. No treaty in force at the time of the enactment of
this Act shall be construed as specific statutory authorization
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for, or a specific exemption permitting, the introduction of the
Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities or in any such
situation, within the meaning of this clause (4); and no provi-
sion of law in force at the time of the enactment of this Act shall
be so construed unless such provision-specifically authorizes the
introduction of such Armed Forces in hostilities or in any such
situation.
REPORTS
SEc. 4. The introduction of the Armed Forces of the United
States in hostilities, or in any situation where imminent involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, under
any of the conditions described in section 3 of this Act shall be
reported promptly in writing by the President to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, together
with a full account of the circumstances under which such Armed
Forces were introduced in such hostilities or in such situation, the
estimated scope of such hostilities or situation, and the consistency
of the introduction of such forces in such hostilities or situation with
the provisions of section 3 of this Act. Whenever Armed Forces of
the United States are engaged in hostilities or in any such situation
outside of the United States, its territories and possessions, the
President shall, so long as such Armed Forces continue to be en-
gaged in such hostilities or in such situation, report to the Congress
periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as
the scope and expected duration of such hostilities or situation, but
in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than every six
months.
THIRTY-DAY AUTHORIZATION PERIOD
SEc. 5. The use of the Armed Forces of the United States in
hostilities, or in any situation where imminent involvement in hos-
tilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, under any of the
conditions described in section 3 of this Act shall not be sustained
beyond thirty days from the date of the introduction of such Armed
Forces in hostilities or in any such situation unless (1) the President
determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable
military necessity respecting the safety of the Armed Forces of the
United States engaged pursuant to section 3(1) or 3(2) of this Act
requires the continued use of such Armed Forces in the course of
bringing about a prompt disengagement from such hostilities; or (2)
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Congress is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack
upon the United States; or (3) the continued use of such Armed
Forces in such hostilities or in such situation has been authorized
in specific legislation enacted for that purpose by the Congress and
pursuant to the provisions thereof.
TERMINATION WITHIN THIRTY-DAY PERIOD
SEC. 6. The use of the Armed Forces of the United States in
hostilities, or in any situation where imminent involvement in hos-
tilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, under any of the
conditions described in section 3 of this Act may be terminated prior
to the thirty-day period specified in section 5 of this Act by an Act
or joint resolution of Congress, except in a case where the President
has determined and certified to the Congress in writing that una-
voidable military necessity respecting the safety of Armed Forces of
the United States engaged pursuant to section 3(1) or 3(2) of this
Act requires the continued use of such Armed Forces in the course
of bringing about a prompt disengagement from such hostilities.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROVISIONS
SEC. 7. (a) Any bill or joint resolution authorizing a continua-
tion of the use of the Armed Forces of the United States in hostili-
ties, or in any situation where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, under any of the condi-
tions described in section 3 of this Act, or any bill or joint resolution
terminating the use of Armed Forces of the United States in hostili-
ties, as provided in section 6 of this Act, shall, if sponsored or co-
sponsored by one-third of the Members of the House of Congress in
which it is introduced, be considered reported to the floor of such
House no later than one day following its introduction unless the
Members of such House otherwise determine by yeas and nays. Any
such bill or joint resolution, after having been passed by the House
of Congress in which it originated, shall be considered reported to
the floor of the other House of Congress within one day after it has
been passed by the House in which it originated and sent to the
other House, unless the Members of the other House shall otherwise
determine by yeas and nays.
(b) Any bill or joint resolution reported to the floor pursuant to
subsection (a) or when placed directly on the calendar shall immedi-
ately become the pending business of the House in which such bill
or joint resolution is reported or placed directly on the calendar, and
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shall be voted upon within three days after it has been reported or
placed directly on the calendar, as the case may be, unless such
House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
SEC. 8. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act
and the application of such provision to any other person or circum-
stance shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE AND APPLICABILITY
SEC. 9. This Act shall take effect on the date of its enactment.
Nothing in section 3(4) of this Act shall be construed to require any
further specific statutory authorization to permit members of the
Armed Forces of the United States to participate jointly with mem-
bers of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the
headquarters operations of high-level military commands which
were established prior to the date of enactment of this Act and
pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the
United States prior to such date.
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